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ABSTRACT 
 
Permanent Wage Cost Subsidies For Older Workers: 
An Effective Tool for Increasing Working Time and 
Postponing Early Retirement?* 
 
In several OECD countries age-targeted wage subsidies have been introduced to increase 
the employment of older workers, but evidence on their effectiveness is scarce. This paper 
examines the effects of a permanent wage cost subsidy in Belgium on the employment rate, 
working time and hourly wage. We estimate these effects by integrating Inverse Probability 
Weighting in a, possibly trend-adjusted, Difference-in-Differences of endogenously sampled 
repeated cross sections. We find small positive short-run impacts on working time and larger 
ones on the employment rate, but only for employees at high risk of leaving to early 
retirement. The wage is not affected. 
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1. Introduction 
The combination of the decreasing share of the working population induced by the ageing of the 
population and the longer life expectancy will be one of the major threats to economic growth and the 
Welfare State in the developed world in the coming decades. Partly in reaction to this threat, the 
European Union (EU) agreed in June 2010 on the “Europe 2020” strategy. One of the major targets is 
to raise the employment rate from 69% in 2010 to 75% by 2020, and this, in particular, through a 
greater involvement of older workers in the work force (European Commission, 2010). Belgium has 
one of the lowest employment rates of older workers in the EU. In 2013 the employment rate among 
the population aged between 55 and 64 attained only 41.7% (50.3% in EU27). Nevertheless, much 
progress has been made. Since 2000 the Belgian Federal government has implemented a series of 
policies to encourage the labour market participation of the elderly (Dejemeppe et al., 2015) and the 
employment rate among older workers has increased by 16.7 percentage points (Eurostat, 2015). The 
question is to what extent this positive trend has been driven by the policies put in place, and if so, 
which interventions have been the most effective. This paper contributes to a better understanding of 
this question by evaluating the impact on employment and wages of a wage cost subsidy targeted at 
older workers. Other countries have introduced similar wage subsidy schemes, widening thereby the 
scope of interest for our findings.1  
In Belgium from the second quarter of 2002 onwards, the private sector employers’ Social Security 
contributions (SSC) were automatically and permanently reduced by €400/quarter for employees 
older than 58 and working 80% of a full-time or more. For part-time employees working between 33% 
and 80% of a full-time, the subsidy was proportionally reduced, but employees working less than the 
lower threshold were not eligible. The average subsidy was worth 4% of the median wage cost, 
including all payroll taxes. This share increased with the wage, reaching a maximum intensity of 13.8% 
for someone working 80% of a full-time at the legal minimum wage. The policy is still in place and its 
coverage has even been extended in 2004 and 2007.2 The cost of the programme is substantial: in 
2004 expenditures on the payroll subsidy represented 0.034% of the GDP and between 2004 and 2011 
in total about 1.3 billion euros of payroll reductions were spent. 
To evaluate the policy we rely on an endogenously stratified random sample of 243,655 Belgians aged 
between 52 and 61 in 2002, the year that the subsidy was introduced. At these ages many individuals 
                                                          
1
 Examples in OECD countries are: Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the U.S., the Netherlands, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom. A description of such measures introduced in the OECD countries is provided in Tables 1-3 of the Internet 
Appendix: http://users.ugent.be/~bcockx/IA_Albanese_Cockx.pdf. 
2 
In 2004 the age requirement was lowered to 57 and in 2007 the subsidy amount was increased, awarding a reduction 
already from age 50 (i.e. €50/quarter for each year above 49) if the worker has a quarterly remuneration lower than €12,000.  
2 
 
(especially women) are not in the labour force in Belgium, and, if they are, their labour market 
mobility is low. Since we aim at evaluating the effect of the aforementioned subsidy on labour market 
transitions, and since privacy protection legislation forbids access to population data, we do not 
randomly draw a sample from the population, as the resulting data would contain many inactive 
individuals. Instead, we stratified the population and oversample individuals working in the salaried 
private sector or making labour market transitions during the period of analysis. However, because 
these strata are related to the outcomes of interest, they are endogenous, and consistent estimation 
of the treatment effect requires appropriate weighting of the data (Manski and Lerman, 1977; 
Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). 
The data were sampled from merged administrative registers of the diverse Social Security institutions 
and of the National Register containing all Belgian inhabitants. These data are exceptionally rich in that 
they contain detailed information on labour market histories and the amount of SSC paid since 1998, 
and on private sector employment from as early as 1957. Using these data we assess the effects of the 
SSC reduction on the employment rate, working time and hourly wages. We base this assessment on a 
Conditional Difference-in-Differences (CDiD) estimator (Heckman et al., 1997). This estimator identifies 
these effects by contrasting the evolution in the outcomes between older and younger groups, 
conditional on a set of observed covariates including the labour market history of these individuals. 
Our contribution to the literature is threefold. First, only few researchers have evaluated the impact of 
wage subsidies targeted at older workers. Ammermüller et al. (2006) and Brussig et al. (2006) have 
studied the impact of in-work benefits (subsidising the net wage of workers), Boockmann et al. (2012) 
of hiring subsidies (targeted to newly created jobs) and, more recently, Huttunen et al. (2013) of 
temporary wage cost subsidies for low-wage older workers. However, we are not aware of any study 
that evaluates the effects of a permanent wage cost subsidy targeted at all older workers, 
irrespectively of their wage, and precisely at the age that they become entitled to early retirement (58 
in Belgium). The latter is of particular interest since it means that the subsidy targets a population that 
is at the margin of leaving the labour force and for which the potential of job retention is higher than 
at other ages. While most of the literature on the impact of early retirement schemes on the 
employment of older workers focused on supply side incentives (see e.g. Burtless, 1986; Krueger and 
Pischke, 1992; Gruber and Wise, 2007; Liebman et al., 2009; Staubli and Zweimüller, 2013), this paper 
provides evidence that also incentives at the demand side matter if there is a pay productivity gap for 
older workers.3  This gap may be induced by a declining productivity profile with age, as can be 
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 Hellerstein et al. (1999) are the first researchers to investigate this question. In this analysis they do not find evidence for a 
pay productivity gap in the U.S., but a recent replication of this seminal analysis reports that pay exceeds productivity for 
workers older than 55 in the manufacturing sector (Hellerstein and Neumark, 2007). Aubert and Crépon (2003, 2006) 
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induced by rapid technological change, or by deferred compensation schemes (Lazear, 1979). This 
results in excess employment (“overmanning”) at the going wage rate. In the absence of early 
retirement schemes, both anti-discriminatory legislation and the threat of labour dispute with trade 
unions refrain employers from dismissing these older workers, even if the costs of retaining them 
exceed the firing costs. Since employment already exceeds labour demand, a wage cost subsidy 
merely reduces this gap and does not affect the level of employment. This is in line with the existing 
empirical evidence of Boockmann et al. (2012) and Huttunen et al. (2013). For those at risk of entering 
early retirement the predictions are, however, different. Early retirement schemes can be seen as an 
agreement between employers and trade unions to make dismissals of older workers acceptable.4 
Consequently, they reduce the level of excess employment. However, a wage cost subsidy reduces the 
attractiveness for employers to dismiss workers through early retirement, and, hence, positively 
affects employment through a higher retention rate.  
Second, since the eligibility to early retirement at age 58 induces a significant drop in the employment 
rate, especially for males in the manufacturing sector, a panel DiD estimator in which the same 
individuals are followed over time is severely downward biased: it cannot distinguish between the 
effect of eligibility to the subsidy and the early retirement scheme, both starting at age 58. To 
eliminate this bias we fix the age and use a CDiD estimator based on a series of cross sections in both 
pre- and post-treatment periods. Following Lechner and Wunsch (2009), we explicitly control for the 
compositional biases that an analysis on different cross-sectional units induces. This estimator 
identifies the treatment effect of the subsidy under the assumption that in the absence of the policy 
the impact of the early retirement scheme is constant over time. A placebo test in the pre-treatment 
period does not reject this assumption for working time and hourly wage as outcome variables, but for 
the employment rate it is rejected. This rejection is caused by a differential time trend already present 
in the pre-treatment period between the treated and control groups. We therefore implement in this 
case a parametric trend adjusted version of this CDiD estimator (Wolfers, 2006).  
Third, we integrate endogenous sampling weights in the CDiD estimator as to control for the 
aforementioned endogenous sampling. Frölich (2007) demonstrates in a standard Kernel matching 
framework that endogenous sampling, contrary to choice-based sampling (i.e. sampling based on the 
treatment status), requires an appropriate re-weighting of the data both in the estimation of the 
propensity score and the treatment effect. We apply this re-weighting within the Weighted 
Difference-in-Differences (WDiD) estimator of Abadie (2005), who implements CDiD by the Inverse 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
establish similar results for this age group in France, Ilmakunnas and Maliranta (2005) for Finland, and Cataldi et al. (2012) 
and Vandenberghe et al. (2013) for Belgium. By contrast, no pay-productivity gap is found in Portugal and in the Netherlands 
(Cardoso et al., 2011; van Ours and Stoeldraijer, 2011). 
4
 This is considered as the main justification of the emergence of the early retirement scheme in Belgium (Claes, 2012, p. 38). 
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Probability Weighting (IPW) estimator proposed by Horvitz and Thompson (1952) and Hirano et al. 
(2003), and advocated for by Busso et al. (2014). Within this approach it is simple to take the 
endogenous sampling into account, since it merely consists in a double re-weighting of the data, once 
to take the endogenous sampling into account and once to make the comparison groups comparable 
to the post-treatment treated group. 
Our findings can be summarized as follows. In line with our theoretical expectations, the subsidy has a 
significant positive effect on the employment at the extensive margin only for workers at high risk of 
entering early retirement (i.e. in sectors where early retirement schemes are widely used). Decreasing 
labour costs for this group by 10% increases the employment probability by 9%, implying an 
employment elasticity close to one. We cannot exclude, however, that this positive effect is partly 
driven by the substitution of older for younger workers. At the intensive margin, the subsidy scheme 
significantly increases working time. However, the elasticities of the wage cost subsidy at the intensive 
margin are small: 0.13 for men and 0.28 for women. Finally, the impact of the wage cost reduction on 
the hourly gross wage (excluding employer’s SSC) is small and not statistically different from zero. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes the institutional setting. Section 3 reviews 
the theoretical and empirical literature on wage subsidies. Section 4 formulates theoretical predictions 
for the wage cost subsidy studied in this research. The sampling scheme and data are described in 
Section 5. Section 6 presents the identification strategy and the estimation method. In Section 7 we 
present our empirical findings and a cost benefit analysis. The last section concludes.  
2. The Institutional Setting in the Period around the Reform in 2002 
In Belgium wage negotiations between employer’s organisations and trade unions take place in 
sectoral joint industrial committees (“commissions paritaires”), usually separately for blue and white-
collar workers. In case of dismissal and after a notice period, workers who have contributed 
sufficiently long to Unemployment Insurance (UI) are entitled to Unemployment Benefits (UB). The 
replacement rate at the start is 55% or 60% depending on the household situation, but there are caps 
and floors, so that it is higher (lower) for low (high) wage workers. UI in Belgium is singular in that 
there is no time limit to the entitlement, although the benefit level decreases with unemployment 
duration for individuals who are not head of household. Moreover, until June 2002 individuals aged 50 
or more who were unemployed for more than one year were not required to be available for the 
labour market, and, in case they had accumulated more than 20 years of working experience, these 
long-term unemployed were entitled to a seniority supplement to their UB. Between 2002 and 2004 
the age of labour market availability was gradually increased to 57, but this availability was hardly 
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verified at that time. Periods of unemployment are assimilated to periods of employment for the 
calculation of statutory pension rights. All in all, UI for workers above age 50 can in the facts be viewed 
as an early retirement scheme, but more generous schemes exist.  
In Belgium there are essentially three early retirement schemes: early retirement within the statutory 
regime, the conventional pre-retirement scheme and the, so-called, “Canada Dry” system.5 Early 
retirement within the statutory regime starts from age 60 after minimum 30 years of employment 
experience. However, due to relatively low generosity of this scheme in the private sector,6 take-up in 
the two alternative regimes was much more important. For workers having more than 20 years of 
employment experience, the conventional pre-retirement regime (also known as the “bridge 
pension”) is available from age 60 for all workers and from 58 in case of an agreement in the sectoral 
joint industrial committee, generally concluded in the manufacturing sector. In restructuring firms and 
for difficult physical professions, the age condition could drop to 50, 52 or 55, depending on the 
sectoral agreement. Because of a supplement equal to half of the difference between the UB and the 
wage and the favourable treatment for the statutory pension, the bridge pension is attractive for 
employees. The scheme imposes, however, a number of requirements on firms. They must pay the 
aforementioned supplement to UB and respect the legal notice period or, alternatively, pay severance 
allowances. Furthermore, supplementary SSC are due and there is an obligation to replace the 
employee by an unemployed worker during a period of three years, although exemptions to this 
obligation are awarded in 57% of the cases (OECD, 2003, p. 75). Despite these requirements, 
employers’ interest in the scheme lies in that it provides a solution to the pay-productivity gap for 
older workers induced by a declining productivity profile with age and, for white-collar employees, by 
deferred payment compensation schemes. Descriptive evidence of Vandenberghe et al. (2013, fig. 1) 
indeed suggests that in Belgium the average pay-productivity gap becomes positive from about age 56 
onwards.7 Both anti-discriminatory legislation and the threat of labour dispute with trade unions 
refrain employers from dismissing these older workers, but by offering a generous early retirement 
employers can nevertheless do so while maintaining social peace with trade unions.  
The “Canada Dry” is an unofficial early retirement scheme in which the employer pays, as in the 
conventional pre-retirement regime, a supplement to UB (half of the difference between the UB and 
the wage). This scheme is more flexible for the employer, since it does not impose an age limit, 
supplementary SSC, or replacement by a younger worker. Since there is no obligation for the worker 
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 “Canada Dry” refers to publicity for the drink Canada Dry: “It has the colour of Whisky, but it is not Whisky”. 
6
 For public sector employees the scheme is much more generous and, hence, more widely used. 
7
 This descriptive evidence is in line with the findings of their subsequent analysis that takes the endogenous composition of 
the older workforce into account, but does not provide exact information by age. 
6 
 
to report the supplement to the UB she obtains, no official figures on the use of the Canada Dry 
scheme are available. The fact that the number of UB recipients older than 50 more than doubled 
between 1996 and 2001 (OECD, 2003, p. 80) while the number of individuals in the conventional pre-
retirement scheme decreased, suggests that the scheme became more popular in that period. 
In Belgium workers above the age of 50 who have more than 20 years of employment experience, 
among which 5 years full-time within the same firm, are encouraged to reduce working time either by 
20% or by 50%. This time credit scheme in the private sector8 is a right for the employee in firms 
employing 10 or more workers and in which no more than 5% of the workforce is already benefiting 
from the scheme. Since the employee is entitled to a monthly flat rate compensation until the age of 
statutory retirement, it is like a part-time retirement scheme (Ibid, p. 56). 
Figure 1: The Quarterly Value of the Wage Cost Subsidy as a Function of Working Time 
 
Fraction of a full-time 
The permanent reduction of SSC for employers by €400 per quarter for private sector employees aged 
58 or more, as well as the temporary hiring subsidy (“ACTIVA”) awarded for maximum five years to 
employers recruiting workers unemployed for more than six months and aged 45 or more, both 
introduced in 2002,9 can be seen among the first attempts in Belgium to increase the employment rate 
of older workers rather than inducing withdrawal from the labour force. We focus our discussion on 
the first mentioned wage subsidy, because this is the object of analysis here. Figure 1 displays how the 
subsidy increases with working time. The subsidy favours part-time employment, since, between 33% 
and 80% of a full-time, it increases at a rate that is 1.25 times the share of working time relative to a 
full-time. Hence, it attains the maximum of €400 when working at least 80% of a full-time 
(0.80*1.25*400=400). At 33% of a full-time the value of the subsidy is €165 (0.33*1.25*400=165). 
Below 33% the SSC reduction abruptly drops to zero. The average subsidy is worth 4% of the median 
                                                          
8
 In the public sector a closely related “career break” scheme exists. 
9
 The ACTIVA replaced an existing similar scheme, so that it was not really a new measure. 
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wage cost, including all payroll taxes. This share decreases with the wage and is maximally equal to 
14% for someone working 80% of a full-time at the minimum wage.  
An essential feature of the subsidy is that it was awarded automatically to firms. This ensured a 100% 
take-up rate. This contrasts with other countries, such as the wage cost subsidy to low-wage older 
workers in Finland, for which employers had to apply and for which the take-up rate was much lower, 
i.e. about 60% (Huttunen et al., 2013). Similarly, in Belgium the take-up rate dropped to 89% for men 
and 70% for women when in 2004 the coverage of the subsidy was widened to those aged 57 or more, 
but no longer awarded automatically. 
3. Literature Review 
1.1. Theory 
It is well known that in a competitive labour market wage subsidies may increase employment if both 
the supply and the demand for labour are sufficiently elastic, and that it does not matter whether 
these subsidies are paid to the employer or the employee: neutrality of the tax incidence (Marshall, 
1920; Kaldor, 1936; Katz, 1996). In a partial equilibrium framework in which E denotes employment, W 
wage cost, s the wage subsidy (at the employer- or employee-side), 𝜖𝐷 the absolute value of the 
uncompensated wage elasticity of labour demand and 𝜖𝑆 the uncompensated wage elasticity of labour 
supply, the standard textbook formulas are given by: 
𝑑 𝑙𝑛 𝐸
𝑑 𝑙𝑛 𝑠
=
1
1
𝜖𝐷
+
1
𝜖𝑆
   and   
𝑑 𝑙𝑛 𝑊
𝑑 𝑙𝑛 𝑠
=
1
1+
𝜖𝑆
𝜖𝐷
     (1) 
Pissarides (1998) demonstrates that also in non-competitive labour markets employment tax cuts may 
have substantial positive effects on employment to the extent that the income out of work is fixed in 
real terms and not indexed to the wage. Moreover he shows that targeting subsidies to low-wage 
workers may enhance the positive employment effects, since the tapering-off of the wage subsidy 
with the wage acts like a progressive tax making it more costly to capture part of the subsidy in a 
higher after tax wage.10 
1.2. Empirical Studies 
Based on more than 70 studies, Hamermesh (1996) suggests that the conditional elasticity of labour 
demand lies in the interval [-0.15, -0.75], with -0.30 being the best available point estimate. More 
recently, Lichter et al. (2014) report, based on a meta-regression analysis, -0.246 as the preferred 
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 See also Hersoug (1984), Pissarides (1985), Lockwood and Manning (1993). 
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point estimate, bracketed by the interval [-0.072;-0.446]. These elasticities exhibit substantial 
heterogeneity. For instance, the demand elasticity decreases with skill level and is higher for atypical 
employment. We are not aware of any study, however, that aims at specifically estimating the 
elasticity of labour demand for older workers.  
Because older workers are wealthier than younger ones, one expects, through the negative income 
effect, the labour supply of older workers to be less elastic (e.g. Zabalza et al., 1980; Hanoch and 
Honig, 1983). Another strand of the literature reports, however, that labour supply is more elastic for 
older workers, both at the intensive (Friedberg, 2000; Keane, 2012) and the extensive margin (Mitchell 
and Fields, 1984; Blau and Riphahn, 1999; French, 2005; Keane and Rogerson, 2012). At the intensive 
margin the institutional setting, such as part-time retirement schemes, may enhance working time 
flexibility, while at the extensive margin the presence of early retirement schemes could make the 
decision to remain at work more sensitive to the wage. However, the labour supply elasticity at the 
extensive margin is asymmetric: elastic for withdrawal from the labour force, but inelastic for entry 
(Blau, 1994). 
In view of the incomplete and partly mixed evidence on the demand for and the supply of older 
workers, it is difficult to predict the impact of wage cost subsidies for older workers. Another strand of 
the literature aims at directly estimating the impacts of wage subsidies. There exists a large literature 
on the effect of in-work benefits (employee-side wage subsidies), especially on the Earned Income Tax 
Credit in the U.S (e.g. Eissa and Liebman, 1996; Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2001; Eissa and Hoynes, 2004), 
that has found substantial positive employment effects, but we are only aware of two studies that 
evaluate the effect of subsidies targeted at older workers. Ammermüller et al. (2006) and Brussig et al. 
(2006) estimate the effect of an in-work benefit in Germany. Their DiD estimator shows a positive, but 
not significant, employment effect, which is higher in West Germany. The lack of significance is 
potentially due to the low take-up rate. 
Overall reductions in employers’ SSC are usually found to be absorbed by a higher hourly wage and, 
hence, effects on employment are insignificant (Bohm and Lind, 1993; Gruber, 1997; Bennmarker et 
al., 2009). However, in line with the theoretical predictions of Pissarides (1985, 1998), there is 
empirical evidence that payroll taxes targeted on low-wage workers do boost employment (Kramarz 
and Philippon, 2001; Crépon and Desplatz, 2003; Goos and Konings, 2007). Nevertheless, this positive 
finding disappears if the reduction of payroll taxes is targeted on low wage older workers. Huttunen et 
al. (2013) estimate by a triple DiD the impact of a temporary five-year reduction of payroll taxes in 
Finland for low-wage full-time employees aged over 54. Despite the precision of their estimates, they 
find small and statistically insignificant employment effects at both the extensive and the intensive 
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margin, while no robust effects on wages. Only for the group aged over 58 some significantly positive 
effects on the intensive margin are reported. This could be related to the part-time retirement scheme 
to which workers of this age group were eligible at that age, since this may increase the elasticity of 
supply at the intensive margin. Finally, Boockmann et al. (2012) study the effects of hiring subsidy on 
older workers in Germany by DiD in duration analysis. Women in East Germany are the only group for 
whom significant employment effects are found. This might be due to the higher generosity of the 
subsidies and to the lower pressure on wages given the higher unemployment rate in this region.  
4. Theoretical Predictions 
From the overview of the literature we conclude that the few studies evaluating the effect of wage 
subsidies targeted to older workers find very small employment effects, if any. We argue that this 
could be a consequence of a pay-productivity gap for older workers. Declining productivity with age, 
possibly induced by rapid technological progress, especially in the manufacturing sector, and deferred 
compensation schemes make average pay exceeds average productivity of older workers. 
Vandenberghe et al. (2013, fig. 1) find that a positive pay-productivity gap emerges in Belgium on 
average from age 56 onwards, and at 58 (the age eligibility for the wage cost subsidy) wage costs 
exceed productivity by 12% on average.11 This has consequences for the effectiveness of a wage cost 
subsidy, but these consequences depend on whether targeted workers are at risk or not of leaving the 
labour force through early retirement. To support the basic intuition of our reasoning, we introduce a 
simple graphical exposition. 
4.1. The Effects of Wage Cost Subsidies for Older Workers in the Absence of Early Retirement 
In the absence of an early retirement scheme, employers refrain dismissing unproductive employees  
for the following reasons: (i) by the Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) they are required to pay 
severance payments; (ii) in case of deferred compensation, breaching the long-term contract harms 
their reputation and may prevent them to conclude new long-term incentive contracts; (iii) anti-
discriminatory legislation makes it more costly to fire older workers; (iv) dismissing these workers 
increases the risk of a costly labour dispute with trade unions. As a consequence, employment exceeds 
labour demand among older workers and there is a pay-productivity gap. In Figure 2 this situation is 
represented by point A. To allow for wage bargaining and unemployment, point A is not located on the 
labour supply 𝑆0(𝑊
𝑐). The pay-productivity gap is equal to the difference between the going wage 
𝑊0
𝑐 and the marginal labour productivity 𝐹′(𝐿0) on labour demand 𝐷0(𝑊
𝑐). Suppose the government 
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 We thank Vincent Vandenberghe for providing the information to calculate these figures. These are descriptive figures, but 
the causal evidence reported in their paper is consistent with the descriptive evidence. 
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introduces a wage cost subsidy 𝑆. This shifts the labour demand curve to the right, to 𝐷2(𝑊
𝑐) in 
Figure 2. However, the level of employment does not increase, since before the intervention 
employment was already exceeding the labour demand. This prediction is in accordance with the 
existing empirical evidence of Huttunen et al. (2013) for Finland.12 Depending on the bargaining power 
of trade unions, the net wage may increase, so that the pay-productivity gap decreases by less than 
the amount of the subsidy. 
Figure 2: Effect of a Wage Cost Subsidy in the Presence of a Pay-Productivity Gap and Early Retirement 
 
𝑊𝑐  = wage cost; 𝐿 = employment; 𝑆(𝑊𝑐) = labour supply; 𝐷(𝑊𝑐) = labour demand; 
𝐹′(𝐿) = marginal labour productivity; 𝐶𝐵𝑃 = employer’s cost of bridge pension; 𝑆 = wage cost subsidy. 
4.2. The Effects of Wage Cost Subsidies for Older Workers in the Presence of Early Retirement 
In Belgium many workers in the manufacturing sector become eligible for early retirement at age 58, 
an age from which their employers are automatically awarded a reduction in SSC, i.e. a wage cost 
subsidy (see Section 2). First, consider the impact of the early retirement scheme. The early retirement 
scheme can be seen as an agreement between employers and trade unions, allowing employers to 
eliminate part of the pay-productivity gap while maintaining social peace (Claes, 2012, p. 38) and, 
hence, the impediments (ii)-(iv) to dismissal mentioned in Section 4.1. However, it remains costly for 
employers to recur to early retirement, because the employer must pay severance payments (cf. (i) in 
Section 4.1), the supplement to UB and higher SSC, and, in some cases they have the obligation to 
replace the employee by an unemployed worker (see in Section 2 the description of the bridge 
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pension). Suppose that these costs per retiree amount to 𝐶𝐵𝑃. Consequently, employers will send 
some of their older employees to early retirement, up to a point that the marginal labour productivity 
is equal the wage cost minus the marginal cost of sending an employee to early retirement: 
𝐹′(𝐿1) = 𝑊0
𝑐 − 𝐶𝐵𝑃. Employment drops from 𝐿0  to 𝐿1 in Figure 2.
13 This reduces, but not completely 
eliminates the pay-productivity gap. At the same time, as eligibility to early retirement increases non-
labour income out of work for the older workers, it shifts the labour supply curve to the left: from 
𝑆0(𝑊
𝑐) to 𝑆1(𝑊
𝑐) in Figure 2. This means that early retirement is partly voluntary, i.e. from D to A, 
and partly involuntary, from B to D. The share of involuntary to voluntary early retirement depends on 
the importance of the income effect on labour supply. Based on survey data, 40% of men and 30% of 
women report to be involuntary early retired in Belgium (Cohen and Elchardus, 2003).  
Consider now a wage cost subsidy 𝑆 that shifts labour demand from 𝐷0(𝑊
𝑐)  to 𝐷2(𝑊
𝑐). Because the 
employment choice before the introduction of the subsidy is optimal for the employer, in this case 
employment increases from 𝐿1 to 𝐿2 if the going net wage remains unaffected. Nevertheless, the 
more the early retirement scheme improves the outside option (and shifts labour supply to the left), 
the more likely that the wage subsidy will dissipate into a higher gross (net of employers’ SSC) and part 
of the employment gain will vanish. This is unlikely to happen in the short-run, however. Consistent 
with this theoretical prediction, we find in our empirical analysis that the Belgian wage cost subsidy 
has a significant positive effect on employment for those workers who are at high risk of entering early 
retirement at age 58 and a small and statistically insignificant (short-run) impact on the hourly wage. 
4.3.  The Effects of Wage Cost Subsidies for Older Workers on Employment at the Intensive Margin 
In general, the wage cost subsidy provides incentives to increase working time, since employers are 
not entitled to it if they employ individuals working less than 33% of a full-time and because the 
subsidy increases together with working time, up to 80% of a full-time (see Figure 1). Employers do 
not have incentives to increase the working time for all workers, but only for those for whom the 
marginal productivity of working exceeds the (post-subsidy) marginal cost. For this sub-population, the 
effect on working time is expected to be larger for workers with an elastic labour supply, such as for 
workers for whom in the absence of the subsidy the time credit scheme encourages to work part-time 
(see Section 2).  
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 This is the outcome of the following simple profit maximization problem in which we assume that employers always sends 
some employees to early retirement, i.e. 𝐿0 > 𝐿 (and here we set 𝑆 = 0): max𝐿 𝐹(𝐿) − (𝑊0
𝑐 − 𝑆)𝐿 − (𝐿0 − 𝐿)𝐶𝐵𝑃 . The first 
order condition for an interior maximum of this problem is: 𝐹′(𝐿) = 𝑊0
𝑐 − 𝑆 − 𝐶𝐵𝑃.  
12 
 
4.4. Anticipatory and Substitution Effects of Wage Cost Subsidies for Older Workers  
Firms anticipate that the wage costs will also go down for younger employees, since they will become 
eligible to the wage cost subsidy as soon as they turn 58. Hence, the subsidy may also positively affect 
the employment of younger workers (Huttunen et al., 2013, p. 55). However, to the extent that wages 
exceed costs also for these younger workers – which is confirmed in the aforementioned evidence of 
Vandenberghe et al. (2013) – and that these workers are less at risk of entering early retirement, we 
do not expect these anticipatory effects to be important. 
By contrast, if older and younger workers are gross substitutes, the subsidy could also negatively affect 
the employment of the younger workers in the control group, since firms may substitute older for 
younger workers. We explained in Section 4.2 that we expect the subsidy to have employment effects 
because it postpones the early retirement of older workers. However, the subsidy also encourages 
firms to push younger instead of older workers into early retirement. The less stringent rules of the 
conventional pre-retirement scheme for restructuring firms and the Canada Dry system make this 
possible. The latter system exploits the feature of the Belgian UI that since 1996 long-term 
unemployed older than 50 are not required to be available for the labour market (Section 2). In the 
empirical analysis we therefore test whether any positive employment effect of the wage cost subsidy 
does not go at the expense of the employment of slightly younger workers.  
Another type of substitution effect relates to the requirement that in about 43% of the industrial 
committees firms using early-retirement schemes are obliged to replace early retirees by unemployed 
workers (see Section 2). If in the counterfactual of no wage cost subsidy, the employer effectively hires 
an otherwise unemployed worker, then the jobs saved by the reduction in SSC contributions go at the 
expense of the hiring of these unemployed. However, we cannot assess the importance of this 
substitution with the available data as the replacement requirement is no guarantee that this hiring 
would not have taken place in the absence of the early retirement scheme.  
5. The Data 
The data were sampled from the “Data warehouse labour market and social protection” in which the 
Crossroads Bank for Social Security14 merges the administrative register data originating from the 
diverse Social Security institutions and the National Register of all Belgian inhabitants. The dataset 
contains individual information on gender, nationality, household and detailed labour market 
characteristics. Information on labour market histories is available since 1957 through the yearly 
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pension registrations, but these contain only information on salaried employment in the private sector 
and temporary salaried employment in the central administration of the public sector. From 1998 
more detailed quarterly information is available covering all types of employment, including self-
employment, civil servants, and temporary salaried workers in the local public administration of 
provinces and municipalities. Table 1 lists the conditioning variables in these combined datasets that 
we use in the empirical analysis.15 
Table 1: Conditioning Variables in the Data 
(at the moment that the outcome is measured, unless specified otherwise) 
Province of residence  
(at end of preceding year) 
11 Provinces 
Nationality Belgian, European Union (EU), other 
Household Characteristics  
Single, single with children, couple, couple with children, other 
Size of the household: 1, 2, 3, 4 5+ 
Presence of members below 18 or above 65 years old (seven quarters earlier) 
Labour Market Characteristics 
seven quarters earlier 
Inactive, unemployed, public sector‡, self-employed, civil servant 
Elapsed unemployment duration in months 
Actual working time in classes 0-30%, 31-80%, 80-100% 
Sector dummies (Regrouped at 1 or 2 digit level) 
Participation in Time Credit (Yes/No) 
Unemployment benefit level (€*/month) 
Working time regime: Full-time, Part-time or special 
Firm size: <5, 5-9, 10-19, 20-49, 50-99, 100-199, 200-499, 500-999, 1000+ 
Employment History as Salaried 
Worker  
(Excluding Civil Servants and 
Employees in the Local Public 
Sector)† 
Experience (in quarters) during: 
Older history (between 28 and 5.5 years before); 
Recent history (between 11 and 7 quarters before) 
Never employed during: 
Older history (between 28 and 5.5 years before); 
Recent history (between 11 and 7 quarters before) 
Number of times received a severance payment during: 
Older history (between 28 and 5.5 years before); 
Recent history (between 11 and 7 quarters before) 
Share of time worked as blue-collar during: 
Older history (between 28 and 5.5 years before); 
Recent history (between 11 and 7 quarters before) 
Average share of working during: 
Older history (between 10.75 and 5.5 years before); 
Recent history (between 11 and 7 quarters before) 
Average full-time quarterly gross earnings from salaried employment (in €*): 
Recent history (between 11 and 7 quarters before) 
* In constant 2004 euros, based on the Consumer Price Index. 
† The employment history excludes the career spent as self-employed, civil servant, and temporary employee in the local public sector, 
comprising the provincial and municipal authorities. Temporary employees in working in the central public administration are included. Since 
the older history is based on a different source (the pension registrations) than the more recent history (the payroll-tax-administration), it 
was not possible to define a consistent labour market history between 12 to 21 quarters prior to the measurement of the outcome. This 
labour market history is therefore missing. 
‡ Public sector comprises both civil servants and temporary salaried workers in the public sector. 
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Privacy protection legislation forbids access to data on the full population but allowed the drawing of a 
sample of fixed size. Thus, we base the analysis on an endogenous sample of these register data 
containing 243,655 individuals born between the 1st of April 1941 and the 31st of March 1950, i.e. 
between 52 and 61 years old in 2002, the year that the subsidy was introduced.16 At these ages many 
individuals (especially women) are not in the labour force in Belgium, and, if they are, their labour 
market mobility is low. Since we aim at evaluating the effect of the aforementioned subsidy on labour 
market transitions, we stratified the data as to oversample individuals in the labour force and making 
labour market transitions during the period of analysis. This increases precision. However, these strata 
are related to the outcomes of interest, and, hence, endogenous. Therefore consistent estimation of 
population statistics and of the treatment effect requires appropriate weighting of the data (Manski 
and Lerman, 1977; Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). 
Table 2: Retained Birth Cohorts and Corresponding Reference Periods 
 Cohort (quarter/year) Reference Period (quarter/year) 
1 2/41-1/42 [2/99-1/02] 
2 2/42-1/43 [2/99-4/01] 
3 2/43-1/44 [2/99-4/03] 
4 2/44-1/45 [2/00-1/05] 
5 2/45-1/46 [2/99-4/03] 
6 2/46-1/47 [2/00-4/04] 
7 2/47-1/48 [2/00-3/05] 
8 2/48-1/49 [2/02-3/05] 
9 2/49-1/50 [2/02-3/05] 
To be more precise, we stratified the population for each gender in 9 birth cohorts defined in Table 2. 
This stratification is exogenous to the outcomes of interest. Each of these 18 strata is subsequently 
endogenously stratified in five substrata, the definition of which depends on a different reference 
period for each birth cohort (see Table 2):  
1. The population exiting salaried employment in the private sector within the reference period; 
2. The population entering salaried employment in the private sector within the reference period 
and not contained in substratum 1; 
3. The population employed throughout the reference period as salaried worker in the private 
sector and earning a gross wage lower than €100 per day at the start of this period; 
4. The population employed throughout the reference period as salaried worker in the private 
sector and earning at least €100 per day at the start of this period; 
5. The population that was not employed as salaried worker in the private sector during the 
reference period, i.e. individuals who were out-of-the- labour force, unemployed, self-
employed or working in the public sector. 
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Since labour mobility of older workers is low, we over-represented the transitions into and out of 
salaried employment in the private sector17 by sampling for each of the 18 strata the complete 
population of substratum 1 and 2. Low-wage workers as defined in substratum 3 are also oversampled 
relative to the high wage workers (substratum 4) and the population not employed in the private 
sector (substratum 5): in each of the 18 strata a random sample of 2,000 individuals is drawn in this 
substratum, while the sample size was 1,500 for substratum 4 and 5.18 Low-wage workers are 
oversampled, because the subsidy intensity decreases with the wage and wage cost subsidies are 
found to have larger effects for these workers (see Section 3). 
The reference periods by birth cohort defined in Table 2 were chosen as to observe sufficient 
transitions in and out of private sector employment during the periods of analysis. However, as it was 
difficult to predict the exact identification strategy before having the data, these reference periods are 
not optimally chosen.19 Nevertheless, they are all situated around the period of interest, i.e. close to 
the introduction of the subsidy in the second quarter of 2002 and the sampling weights still allow us to 
make unbiased inference on the population.  
As explained in more detail in the next section, the empirical analysis contrasts the evolution of a 
number of outcome variables (the employment rate, the fraction of individuals working less than 30% 
of a full-time worker, between 30% and 80%, more than 80%, the “approximate” fraction of a full-time 
that an individual works,20 and the hourly wage rate) between eligible workers (= treated group) and 
non-eligible younger workers (= control group). Table A.1 in the Appendix reports descriptive statistics 
of the conditioning variables listed in Table 1 for the treated and control groups used in the 
benchmark analysis. Since the empirical analysis is performed by gender, the male and female 
populations are explicitly distinguished in this descriptive analysis. Because of the endogenous 
stratified sampling, the individual observations 𝑖 belonging to birth cohort 𝑐 (= 1, 2, … , 9) and to the 
substratum 𝑠 (= 1, 2, … , 5) are reweighed by the sampling weights 𝑆𝑊𝑖 as to obtain a correct 
description of the corresponding populations (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005): 
𝑆𝑊𝑖 =  
𝑁𝑐𝑠
𝑁
 ∗  
𝑛
𝑛𝑐𝑠
       (2) 
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 We restrict the sample to private sector salaried employment, since only these workers are eligible to the subsidy.  
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 In cases that the population of the substratum was smaller than the population, the complete population was sampled. 
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 The data could only be obtained after a lengthy procedure, so that redefining the reference periods was not an option. 
20
 We do not have information on hours, but on the fraction of working time in a quarter relative to a full-time worker in 10 
percent classes. The “approximate” fraction is set to the midpoint of the corresponding time-class (e.g. 55.5 for someone 
who works between 51% and 60% of a full-time worker). 
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where 𝑁𝑐𝑠 denotes the size of the population in substratum 𝑐𝑠,
21 𝑛𝑐𝑠 the corresponding sample size, 
𝑁 ≡ ∑ ∑ 𝑁𝑐𝑠
5
𝑠=1
9
𝑐=1  the total population size and n the corresponding sample size. As to avoid 
cumbersome notation, gender is not explicitly referred to. The weighting formula comes from a 
double re-weighting, within and between cohorts.22 Table A.1. also reports the p-values of the t-
statistics testing the equality of the means between treated and control groups. Based on these 
statistics it is clear that treated and control groups are different in several dimensions. This justifies 
the use of a CDiD estimator. 
6. The Identification Strategy and Estimation Method 
Since the policy measure that we evaluate is targeted on a clearly defined sub-population (private 
sector employees aged 58 or more) and is introduced at a precise date (April 1, 2002), it is quite 
natural to use a simple DiD estimator to identify the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) of 
the wage cost subsidy on a number of outcomes. Nevertheless, a number of factors complicate the 
analysis: (i) the early retirement scheme induces a significant drop in the employment rate at 58, the 
same age at which the eligibility to the wage cost subsidy starts; (ii) anticipatory and substitution 
effects may affect the outcomes of control units; (iii) compositional differences between treated and 
control populations lead to a violation of the underlying identifying assumptions; (iv) the 
endogenously stratified sampling needs to be taken into account. 
6.1. Accounting for Age-Related Shocks in the Outcome Variable 
Figure 3 reports the evolution of the employment rate of birth cohorts turning 58 in the pre- (left 
panel) and in the post-treatment period (right panel). The employment rate declines with age, and this 
decline clearly accelerates at 58 and 60, ages at which people become eligible for early retirement (see 
Section 2). The drops in the employment rate are especially marked for men, because more men are 
employed in the declining manufacturing sector in which early retirement is more prevalent, while 
women tend to be more employed in the service sector. A consequence is that a panel DiD estimator 
in which the same individuals are followed over time is severely downward biased, even if we would 
take a trend adjusted version of it, since it cannot distinguish the effect of eligibility to the subsidy 
from that to the early retirement scheme, both starting at 58. As shown by the lower blue lines in 
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 We have information on the population sizes in each substratum, i.e. on 𝑁𝑐𝑠. 
22
 First, to restore the representativeness within the cohorts we reweigh the units within each cohort by 𝑆𝑊𝑐𝑠
𝑐 =
𝑁𝑐𝑠
𝑁𝑐
 ∗  
𝑛𝑐
𝑛𝑐𝑠
 
(where 𝑁𝑐 and 𝑛𝑐 is the size of the cohort in the population and in the sample). To make the cohorts in the sample 
representative for the population, we weight each cohort a second time:  𝑆𝑊𝑐𝑠 = 𝑆𝑊𝑐𝑠
𝑐 ∗ 
𝑁𝑐
𝑁
 ∗  
𝑛
𝑛𝑐
, so that 𝑆𝑊𝑐𝑠 =  
𝑁𝑐𝑠
𝑁
 ∗  
𝑛
𝑛𝑐𝑠
.  
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Figure 3 the drop of the employment rate at 58 is already present in the pre-treatment period.23 This 
suggests that it is possible to account for this drop by implementing a DiD estimator based on 
repeated cross-sections in which the age of treated and control groups is fixed over time instead of 
the individual. In the baseline model we compare treated units aged 58 to 59.5 to control units aged 
53.25-55.25. The choice of the age range of the control group is related to the issue of anticipatory 
and substitution effects. The maximum age of the treated units is 59.5 as in our data this is the oldest 
cohort at the beginning of the pre-treatment period. 
Figure 3: Employment Rate of Birth Cohorts Turning 58 in the Pre- and Post-Treatment Period 
 
Evolution of the employment rate of birth cohorts turning 58 during the pre-
treatment period (left panel) and in the post-treatment period (right panel). The 
vertical red lines indicate the quarter in which the cohort turns 58, 60 and 65. 
Employment rates are weighted by the sampling weights defined in Equation (2). 
 
6.2. Anticipatory and Substitution Effects 
In Section 4.4 we argued that the wage cost subsidy may induce anticipatory or substitution effects on 
workers younger than 58. If the younger control group is affected by anticipatory effects this would 
bias the ATT downwards, while substitution effects would lead to an upwards bias. We argued that 
substitution effects are likely to be a more important concern than anticipatory effects.  
Independently of which of these two effects is dominant, we must avoid selecting the control groups 
who are just slightly younger than 58, because the aforementioned spill-over effects are likely to be 
more important the closer the age eligibility threshold. The youngest age at which we can select 
control individuals within the available sample and given the chosen methodology is 53.25 years. In 
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 The drop of the employment rate in the post-treatment period is even larger, suggesting a negative effect of the wage cost 
subsidy on employment. However, this is descriptive evidence, which does not condition on the predetermined variables and 
does not control for the differential trend in the employment rates of treatment and control groups (see below). 
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the baseline analysis we will therefore define control groups as individuals in the age range 53.25-
55.25. In a sensitivity analysis we then increase the upper range of these control groups to 57 years. By 
comparing the magnitude of the effects obtained in the baseline and in the sensitivity analysis, we can 
judge to what extent these spill-over effects are important and which of the two dominates.  
Another type of anticipatory effect needs to be taken into account. Because the policy plan was 
discussed in the media, it could have been anticipated by employers before it was enacted. The fact 
that the wage cost subsidy has been implemented retroactively – the Royal Decree for this measure 
was published only on the 26th of June 2002, while the subsidy was already granted from April 1 – 
makes such anticipation less likely. Nevertheless, in the analysis we end the pre-treatment period on 
the 31st of December 2001 and, hence, allow for such anticipation during the first quarter of 2002. 
Figure 4: DiD with Multiple Repeated Cross Sections: Fixing Age over Time 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C = Control group; T= Treatment group. 
Figure 4 graphically represents the DiD methodology used in the baseline analysis. The post-treatment 
period starts in the second quarter of 2002, when the subsidy was awarded for the first time. We limit 
the analysis to the short run as the treatment period ends five quarters later, in the second quarter of 
2003. This end is determined by the reform in January 2004 that reduced the age eligibility threshold 
to 57 and excluded several sectors from the reduction (e.g. health services, education and hotels). We 
stop the evaluation period two quarters earlier to allow for anticipatory effects of this reform. The 
outcomes are measured at the end of each quarter in the pre- and post-treatment periods for both 
control and treatment groups. We fix in each quarter the age range of the treated groups from 58 to 
59.5 years and for the control groups from 53.25 to 55.25 years. Formally the DiD estimator amounts 
to estimating the following linear regression equation, which is a slight modification of the standard 
version (Meyer, 1995), since it involves multiple pre- and post-treatment periods: 
𝑌𝑖𝑞 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛼𝑞 ∗ 𝑇𝑞
5
𝑞=−4 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑞 + ∑ 𝛿𝑞 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑞 ∗ 𝑇𝑞
5
𝑞=0 + 𝜖𝑖𝑞          (3) 
where  
4q 2000 
58 
59.5 
 
After 
53.25 
55.25 
58 
59.5 
53.25 
55.25 
58 
59.5 
53.25 
55.25 
Before 
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 𝑞 = −5, −4, … , −1 denotes the five quarters in the pre-treatment period, 𝑞 = 1, 2, … ,5 
denotes the five quarters in the post-treatment period, and 𝑞 = 0 denotes the first quarter of 
2002, during which firms may anticipate the introduction of the wage cost subsidy; 
 𝑌𝑖𝑞 is the outcome measured for individual i in quarter q; 
 𝐷𝑖𝑞 = 1 if individual i is between 58 and 59.5 years old in quarter 𝑞 and, hence, belongs to the 
treated group; 
 𝐷𝑖𝑞 = 0 if individual i is between 53.25 and 55.25 years old in quarter 𝑞 and, hence, belongs to 
the control group;24 
 𝑇𝑞 = 1 if the time period in which the outcome is measured is quarter 𝑞 and 𝑇𝑞 = 0 
otherwise. 
The time effects are captured by the constant term 𝛼 measuring the effect in quarter 𝑞 = −5, and by 
𝛼𝑞 (for 𝑞 = −4, −3, … ,5) measuring the time effects in deviation from the first quarter. The effect of 
belonging to the treatment group – aged between 58 and 59.5 – is captured by 𝛽. The ATT in quarter 𝑞 
(𝑞 = 0,1, … ,5) is measured by 𝛿𝑞. The error term of the regression is 𝜖𝑖𝑞. 
6.3. Accounting for Compositional Differences Between Treated and Control Groups 
At the end of Section 5 we mentioned that the observed composition of treatment and control groups 
differs on average. This does not invalidate a DiD analysis to the extent that these differences remain 
constant over time, but this is not the case as in each quarter new individuals enter and exit the two 
groups. We therefore apply a CDiD estimator (Heckman et al., 1997) in which we explicitly control for 
possible compositional biases in this multi-period framework. This estimator requires that, conditional 
on the observed explanatory variables, the outcomes of treated and control groups evolve according 
to a parallel trend in the absence of a treatment. Moreover, by conditioning on observed covariates 
treated and control units become more comparable, which makes the DiD less vulnerable to the 
assumption that the selection on unobservables should be additive (Athey and Imbens, 2006).  
Choice of the Conditioning Variables and the Identification strategy 
We listed in Table 1 the conditioning variables that we use in the empirical analysis. Among these 
variables are lagged outcomes of interest and other potentially endogenous variables. Since the post-
treatment period, including the first quarter of 2002 during which the policy might have been 
anticipated, lasts six quarters, we ensure that these lagged variables are predetermined by measuring 
them all at least seven quarters prior to the outcome variable of interest.  
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In their survey article, Imbens and Wooldridge (2009, p. 70) have expressed doubts on whether the 
CDiD estimator can improve upon the standard matching estimator in case panel data are available, so 
that lagged outcomes can be conditioned upon. The intuition is that if one conditions on the same pre-
treatment outcome in the pre- and post-treatment period, then it is difficult to see how differencing 
can make treated and control units more comparable, since the pre-treatment outcome already 
captures the selection on the individual fixed effect. However, as argued by Chabé-Ferret (2012), this 
intuition no longer holds if one allows for selection on transitory shocks in the outcome variable.  
Our setting is different from the aforementioned literature. We do not have a standard panel data 
setting since, as mentioned in Section 6.1, the treatment is selected on an age related shock induced 
by the availability of the early retirement scheme (the “bridge pension”) at age 58. We therefore 
implement the CDiD estimator based on repeated cross sections (containing panel information) in 
which we fix the age (instead of the individual) in both treated and control group. In such a setting the 
pre-treatment outcomes differ between pre- and post-treatment period, because they refer to 
different individuals. Even if the standard matching estimator makes these individuals similar in terms 
of employment history and other characteristics, it cannot eliminate fixed unobserved age-related 
differences between the older treatment group and the younger control group. Figure A.1 indeed 
shows that in the pre-treatment period large differences in outcomes between treated and control 
group remain even if these groups are appropriately matched.25 However, since, apart from the 
employment rate, these differences are constant over time, i.e. display a “parallel trend”,26 the CDID 
differences this unobserved age effect out. By contrast, for the employment rate we observe a 
differential trend, which suggests an alternative identification strategy to which we return below.   
The Implementation Method 
In order to estimate the ATT, Heckman et al. (1997) implement the CDiD method by matching control 
to treated units on the basis of the propensity score (PS) before taking the double difference in the 
outcomes. In this paper we instead apply the Weighted DiD (WDiD) estimator of Abadie (2005). This 
estimator makes the control units comparable to the treated by Inverse Probability Weighting (IPW) as 
proposed by Horvitz and Thompson (1952) and Hirano et al. (2003). Busso et al. (2014) advocate using 
this method in cases that overlap of the distribution of the PS between treated and control groups is 
good,27 which is the case in this empirical application. Based on the efficient trimming rule of Crump et 
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 As explained below, we do not match to make treated and control units comparable, but instead weigh the observations. 
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 This hypothesis cannot be formally rejected based on the placebo tests defined below.  
27
 In an empirical Monte Carlo analysis Huber et al. (2013) confirm the reliability of IPW, although it is outperformed by some 
alternative matching estimators. More recently, Frölich et al. (2015) have found that the IPW in which the PS is 
parametrically estimated is one of the best performing estimators after a few non-parametric estimators. 
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al. (2009), which removes the units with a PS above a certain threshold, we trimmed over all 
estimations at most 0.4% of the reference treatment group defined below.28 Other reasons for 
choosing this estimator is that it is simple to take the endogenous sampling present in our data into 
account and that it is not very computationally intensive, which matters given the large sample size, 
the CDiD framework with multiple periods and that we bootstrap the standard errors (see below). 
The WDiD estimator can be implemented by estimating regression Equation (3) by Weighted Least 
Squares (WLS). Since we implement the WDiD estimator with a series of cross-sections instead of the 
usual four treated/control groups and before/after periods, we must modify the standard procedure 
(Blundell et al., 2004) and choose a reference treatment group to which we make the other groups 
comparable (Lechner and Wunsch, 2009). We choose the treated group in the second quarter of 2002, 
i.e. 𝑞 = 1, to be this reference.  
The estimation procedure then consists of the following steps: 
1. Estimate, using the observed conditioning variables 𝑋𝑖𝑞 for individual 𝑖 in quarter 𝑞, the PS 
of belonging to the reference treatment group (𝑇1) for all treated (𝑇𝑞) and control groups 
(𝐶𝑞) in all quarters 𝑞 ≠ 1, and for just the control group 𝐶1 if 𝑞 = 1, by logistic 
regressions.29 
2. Trim the data on the basis of Crump et al.’s (2009) efficient trimming rule.30 The trimmed 
treated group in q=1 is composed of the intersection of all the common supports in all the 
estimations of the PS 
3. Re-estimate the PS on the trimmed data and denote the corresponding estimates of the 
PS by ?̂?𝐽(𝑋𝑖𝑞), where  𝐽 ∈ Γ ≡ {𝑇−5, 𝐶−5 , 𝑇−4, 𝐶−4 , … , 𝐶0, 𝐶1, 𝑇2, … , 𝑇5, 𝐶5}. 
4. Estimate Equation (3) by WLS using the following weights: 
𝑃𝑊𝑖 =
?̂?𝐽(𝑋𝑖𝑞)
1−?̂?𝐽(𝑋𝑖𝑞)
1
𝑁𝐽
 ∑
?̂?𝐽(𝑋𝑖𝑞)
1−?̂?𝐽(𝑋𝑖𝑞)
𝑁𝐽
𝑖=1⁄      for i ∈ J and J ∈ Γ,  and  PWi = 1 for I ∈ T1         (4) 
where 𝑁𝐽 denotes the number of individuals in group 𝐽 and where, following Busso et al. 
(2014), we normalize the weights to one by dividing the individual weight by the average 
weight in the corresponding group.31 
                                                          
28
 We also tried out the alternative trimming rule proposed by Huber et al. (2013), but according to this rule virtually no 
individuals should be discarded from the treatment group, even if we decrease the threshold of the trimming weight from 4% 
to 1%. This may be related to the much larger sample size in this application relative to the largest one used in the 
aforementioned paper. On the other hand, it is also a confirmation that the overlap is good in our empirical application. 
29
 Since the membership to the treated or control group depends on the age of the individual, it depends on the quarter in 
which the individual is observed. This justifies the presence of subscript q in 𝐶𝑞 and 𝑇𝑞. 
30
 The trimming eliminates treated units outside of the common support. 
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Endogenous Sampling 
In Section 5 we explained that our sample is endogenously stratified. Frölich (2007) demonstrates in a 
standard Kernel matching framework that, contrary to choice-based sampling, endogenous sampling 
requires appropriate re-weighting of the data both in the estimation of the propensity score and the 
treatment effect. It is straightforward to implement these adjustments for our WDiD. First, in steps 1 
and 3 we weight each observation in the logistic regressions by the sampling weights 𝑆𝑊𝑖 defined in 
Equation (2). Second, in step 4 a double weighting should be applied by replacing 𝑃𝑊𝑖 by 𝑃𝑊𝑖*𝑆𝑊𝑖. 
Statistical Inference 
By weighting, the Least Squares estimator becomes heteroskedastic. In addition, the fact that 
individuals may belong to multiple cross-sections considered in our WDiD estimator induces serial 
correlation. Correct inference requires therefore using cluster-robust standard errors. However, these 
cluster-robust standard errors lead to conservative inference, since they do not take into account that 
the PS in the weights 𝑃𝑊𝑖 are estimated. It has indeed been shown in the literature that taking into 
account that the PS are not known, but estimated in a first step can increase the precision of the 
estimator (Hirano et al., 2003; Wooldridge, 2010, pp. 500–502 and 824–827). We do this by 
bootstrapping the standard errors. Since our data come from an endogenously stratified sample, we 
cannot apply a standard bootstrap, however. Instead we implement a stratified bootstrap by randomly 
drawing for each replication 𝑛𝑐𝑠 individuals within each cohort-stratum 𝑐𝑠. This is valid because in the 
sampling individuals within each cohort-stratum are randomly drawn. Notice, as to account for serial 
correlation, we re-sample within each replication the same individuals in all cross-sections. Because of 
the large sample size and the high number of times we have to estimate the PS to obtain the ATT (i.e. 
42 for each outcome and population considered), we limit the number of replications in the bootstrap 
to 200. The reported standard errors are the empirical estimates in the bootstrap sample. Confidence 
intervals are constructed on the assumption of Normality. 
Placebo Tests and Parametric Trend-Adjusted WDiD 
The WDiD crucially depends on the assumption that the double weighted outcomes of treated and 
controls follow a parallel path in the absence of the treatment. We have already mentioned that 
graphically the outcome variables, apart from the employment rate, clearly display a parallel trend 
(see Figure A.1 in the Appendix). We also test for this formally in the following placebo test. We divide 
the pre-treatment period in two (grouping the first three and the last two quarters of this period) and 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
31
 Stata automatically normalizes the weights in the regression by specifying the option pweights. Since the normalization 
performed by Stata is slightly different (it divides the individual weight by the average weights of the whole sample), we 
recommend manually normalizing the weights (i.e. by treatment status).  
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implement the WDiD estimator (maintaining 𝑇1 as reference group) on this subsample by assimilating 
the last quarters of the pre-treatment period to a placebo post-treatment period. The placebo test 
consists in testing whether the placebo treatment has a statistically significant effect.  
If the placebo test is rejected, which is the case for the employment rate, we propose a parametric 
trend adjusted WDiD estimator similar to the one proposed by Wolfers (2006), rather than the non-
parametric one proposed by Bell et al. (1999) and Blundell and Costa Dias (2009), because the pre-
treatment period is too short (five quarters) to implement the non-parametric version. We do this 
because the graphical analysis of the evolution in the employment rate in the pre-treatment period 
clearly displays a differential time trend between treated and control groups (see Figure A.1 - top 
panel - in the Appendix).32 If the difference in growth rate in the employment of the two groups 
remains constant, i.e. we can rely on parallel growths rather than parallel paths, then the trend 
adjusted WDiD is a consistent estimator. Such parallel growths imply that the employment rate of 
younger generations (the control group) declines at a lower rate than that of the older ones (the 
treatment group). A possible explanation for the differential evolution in the employment rate is the 
data do not contain information on the level of educational attainment. Since we cannot condition on 
this level in the empirical analysis, the slower decline in the employment rate for the younger 
generations may be caused by higher level of educational attainment of the younger relative to the 
older generations, since the high educated withdraw less rapidly from the labour market than the low 
educated. The parametric trend adjusted estimator consists in adding a common 𝛾 ∗ 𝑞 and a 
differential trend for the treatment groups 𝜇 ∗ (𝑞 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑞) in regression Equation (3) and to 
subsequently follow the same estimation steps as described earlier: 
 𝑌𝑖𝑞 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛼𝑞 ∗ 𝑇𝑞
5
𝑞=−3 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑞 + 𝛾 ∗ 𝑞 + 𝜇 ∗ (𝑞 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑞) + ∑ 𝛿𝑞 ∗ (𝐷𝑖𝑞 ∗ 𝑇𝑞)
5
𝑞=0 + 𝜖𝑖𝑞  (5) 
Note that identification of these trends requires normalizing one common quarterly time effect to 
zero. We choose to set 𝛼−4 = 0. 
7. Results 
In this section we report the results of our estimations. The analysis is performed separately for men 
and women. We focus on the following outcomes: the employment rate (i.e. the extensive margin), 
the time worked (i.e. the intensive margin) in three categories (less than 30% of a full-time worker, 
between 30% and 80%, and more than 80%), a measure approximating working time and the hourly 
                                                          
32
 As the parallel path for the intensive margin of women and the gross hourly wage is not consistent between the 4
th
 quarter 
2000 and the 1
st
 quarter 2001, for these scenarios we start the pre-treatment period in the 1
st
 quarter of 2001. 
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wage rate. For the employment rate as outcome variable, we do not only report the ATT on the total 
population within the selected age category (58-59.5), but also on the sub-population that is already in 
salaried employment in the private sector seven quarters before the measurement of the outcome. 
We focus on the effect of the latter group, since, if the wage cost subsidy has any effect on the 
employment of older workers, it is more likely to have an effect on the separation rate than on the 
hiring rate (see Section 3). For each of the outcomes we also estimate the ATT on particular 
subpopulations (for the employment rate within the subpopulation that is already employed): low-
wage workers earning less than the median wage in the aforementioned employed subpopulation, 
blue and white-collar workers, manufacturing sector and service sector, large firms and small firms, 
and salaried workers employed in sectoral joint industrial committees (“commissions paritaires”; see 
Section 2) in which in the pre-treatment period the exit rate from employment was for employees 
aged 57.75 within the next two quarters above or below the median rate (i.e. 18%).33 The latter two 
subpopulations were constructed with the aim of testing our hypothesis that the employment effect 
of the wage cost subsidy is significantly positive only for employees with a high risk of entering early 
retirement at 58 (see Section 4.2). The inclusion of separate effects for blue-collar workers and 
employees in the manufacturing sector has the same justification, since these subpopulations were at 
higher risk of entering early retirement. Except for the employment rate, we estimated the effect of 
the wage cost subsidy by WDiD. Since for the employment rate the placebo test failed, we estimated 
the ATT for this outcome by the trend adjusted WDiD. The PS-reweighted sample was always well 
balanced. In 98% of the 1,680 times that we reweighted the units, not any variable had a Standardized 
Bias above 5%. Moreover, the lowest p-value of the log-likelihood test was 0.98 and the highest R-
squared 0.002.34 Here we limit to reporting the average ATT of the subsidy in the post-treatment 
period, i.e. 𝛿̅ ≡ ∑ δ𝑞/5
5
q=1 .
35  
7.1. Effect on the Employment Rate 
Table 3 reports both for men (top panel) and women (bottom panel) the ATT of the wage cost subsidy 
on the employment rate of the population aged between 58 and 59.5 (first column), as well on those 
already employed 7 quarters earlier (all columns beyond the first). The overall ATT is positive but 
insignificantly different from zero: the reform enhanced the employment rate of men by 0.4 
percentage points (pp) and of women by 0.3 pp on average. In terms of semi-elasticities, this effect is 
                                                          
33
 In case the information of the industrial committee was missing, the separation rate of the sector was considered. 
34
 The two last mentioned tests were proposed by Sianesi (2004). 
35
 More detailed estimation results for the overall population and for the high and low exit rate committees can be found in 
an Internet Appendix: http://users.ugent.be/~bcockx/IA_Albanese_Cockx.pdf. Other results are available from the authors 
upon request. 
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comparable to the ones that were found by Huttunen et al. (2013). A 10% increment of the subsidy 
increases the employment rate for men by 1.1 pp and for women by 0.5 pp, which is very close to the 
range of 0.44 to 0.86 pp reported by Huttunen et al. for the temporary wage cost subsidy in Finland 
(Ibid., p. 57). However, since the employment rate of the older workers in Belgium is much lower, the 
implied employment elasticities are much higher in Belgium than in Finland: 0.6 and 0.7, respectively 
for Belgian men and women, while in Finland the corresponding elasticity is about 0.1. 
In Section 4.1 we argued that in the absence of early retirement schemes we do not expect a wage 
cost subsidy to have any impact on employment, since the pay-productivity gap for older workers 
results in employment in excess of labour demand and the wage cost subsidy is insufficiently large to 
reverse this gap. Firms actually would prefer firing their older employees, but are inhibited doing so, 
because of employment protection regulation and because trade unions threaten them with social 
disruptions. The finding of an insignificant overall impact of the wage cost subsidy on employment is in 
accordance with this hypothesis. 
Nevertheless, in Section 4.2 we also argued that the economic environment is different for those 
salaried employees whose working conditions are determined by joint industrial committees that have 
agreed on allowing dismissals to early retirement at age 58, the same age threshold at which workers 
become eligible for the reduction in employers’ SSC. For these workers the subsidy may prevent entry 
in early retirement and, hence, have a positive effect on the employment rate. Since these agreements 
were usually concluded for blue-collar workers in the manufacturing sector, we would expect the 
effect of the subsidy to be concentrated on these groups. For men working in the manufacturing 
sector the subsidy did indeed significantly increase employment by 2.4 pp. For women the impact is 
also 2.4 pp, but statistically insignificant, presumably because most women work in the service sector. 
However, for blue-collar workers, no significant effects are found, but this might be because we did 
not restrict to blue-collar workers for whom an agreement facilitating access to early retirement was 
concluded. This is why we tried to refine our measurement by constructing the aforementioned 
indicator identifying workers at high risk of entering early retirement at age 58. For these groups of 
workers the impact is large (2.2 pp for men and 3.1 pp for women) and statistically significant for men, 
but not for women (a p-value of 0.132). The lower precision of the effect for women is most likely 
caused by the much lower female employment rate in that age class: it is less than half as large as the 
male one. This corresponds to an employment elasticity of the subsidy of 0.9 for both men and 
women. 
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Table 3: Impact on the Employment Rate (Extensive Margin) 
Men 
Overall 
(1) 
Already  
Working (2)  
Low Wage 
(3) 
Manufacturing  
Sector (4) 
Service 
 Sector  (5) 
High Exit Rate  
Committee (6) 
Low Exit Rate  
Committee  (7) 
Large Firms 
(8) 
Small Firms 
(9) 
Blue-collar 
(10) 
White-collar 
(11) 
ATT in pp 0.4 1.5 0.9 2.4* 0.6 2.2** -0.3 2.4 -1.0 0.3 1.7 
95% CI [-0.3; 1.1] [-0.4; 3.4] [-1.3; 3.1] [-0.2; 4.9] [-2.1; 3.3] [0.0; 4.5] [-3.1; 2.5] [-1.2; 6.1] [-3.3; 1.3] [-1.9; 2.6] [-0.6; 4.0] 
Pvalue 0.243 0.113 0.436 0.066 0.655 0.048 0.850 0.190 0.413 0.774 0.140 
ATT % 2.3% 2.3% 1.6% 4.4% 0.8% 4.1% -0.4% 4.0% -1.4% 0.6% 2.3% 
N° of observations 758,565 538,932 316,951 301,677 230,980 349,438 189,368 295,058 242,773 301,283 237,546 
N° of individuals 152,015 116,859 71,764 64,997 51,735 77,269 43,599 64,252 55,541 65,885 51,552 
Subsidy/Labor cost 3.7% 3.6% 5.0% 3.4% 3.8% 4.3% 3.0% 2.9% 4.4% 4.4% 4.4% 
Elasticity 0.632 0.647 0.311 1.302 0.217 0.941 -0.119 1.387 -0.321 0.120 0.634 
Semi-Elasticity in pp 0.111 0.414 0.176 0.697 0.161 0.517 -0.091 0.845 -0.221 0.076 0.391 
             
Women 
Overall 
(1) 
Already  
Working (2)  
Low Wage 
(3) 
Manufacturing  
Sector (4) 
Service 
 Sector  (5) 
High Exit Rate  
Committee (6) 
Low Exit Rate  
Committee  (7) 
Large Firms 
(8) 
Small Firms 
(9) 
Blue-collar 
(10) 
White-collar 
(11) 
ATT in pp 0.3 0.0 -0.2 2.4 -0.6 3.1 -1.8 0.8 -0.9 -0.8 0.8 
95% CI [-0.2; 0.8] [-2.8; 2.8] [-4.7; 4.2] [-4.2; 9.0] [-3.6; 2.4] [-0.9; 7.1] [-5.5; 1.9] [-3.0; 4.6] [-4.7; 2.9] [-6.2; 4.6] [-2.3; 3.9] 
Pvalue 0.208 0.990 0.921 0.473 0.683 0.132 0.333 0.683 0.633 0.780 0.593 
ATT % 4.0% 0.3% -0.3% 4.5% -0.8% 5.2% -2.3% 1.3% -1.2% -1.2% 1.2% 
N° of observations 444,838 284,075 140,967 51,539 228,586 147,600 136,450 139,503 144,524 96,907 187,088 
N° of individuals 88,835 61,923 33,543 11,077 50,034 33,538 30,178 30,435 33,064 22,502 39,780 
Subsidy/Labor cost 5.5% 5.4% 7.6% 4.5% 5.5% 5.7% 5.2% 4.9% 6.0% 6.0% 6.0% 
Elasticity 0.717 0.005 -0.044 1.010 -0.155 0.901 -0.452 0.258 -0.201 -0.176 0.197 
Semi-Elasticity in pp 0.055 0.003 -0.030 0.541 -0.114 0.534 -0.354 0.162 -0.152 -0.128 0.140 
WDiD on parallel growths: impact on the employment rate. Control group is 53.25-55.25 years old; treated group 58-59.5 years old. Effects on specific subpopulation (defined in q-7) by 
column: (1) Overall treated group, (2) Workers earning less than the treatment group median wage, (3) Workers in secondary sector, (4) Workers in tertiary sector, (5) Workers in sectoral 
industrial committees with an exit rate from employment above the median (= 18%), (6) Workers in sectoral industrial committees with an exit rate below the median, (7) Workers in firms with 
at least 200 employees, (8) Workers in firms with less than 200 employees, (9) Blue-collar workers, (10) White-collar workers. Point estimates of the ATT are expressed in percentage points 
(pp), in proportional (%) changes in the employment rate and in terms of (semi-)elasticity, i.e. the proportional (pp) effect on the employment rate of a proportional reduction in the labour 
costs. N° of observations is the sum of the number of individuals observed in each quarter of the analysis. Standard errors are obtained by a stratified bootstrap (clustering by individual) with 
200 repetitions and 95% confidence intervals (CI) by assuming normality. ***: significant at 1%, **: significant at 5%, *: significant at 10%. 
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Table 4:  Impact on the Share in Early Retirement and Other Non-Employment States 
Men Manufacturing Sector High Exit Rate Committee 
  Bridge pension (1) Other Exit (2) Bridge pension (3) Other Exit (4) 
ATT in pp -2.1**    -0.4 -3.7***  1.1 
95% CI [-3.8;  -0.4] [-2.3, 1.5] [-5.1;  -2.3] [0.6, 2.8] 
Pvalue  0.048 0.695 0.000 0.195 
ATT % -5.8% -3.6% -10.3% 12.1% 
N° of observations 301,678 301,678 349,436 349,436 
N° of individuals 64,997 64,997 77,269 77,269 
 
Women Manufacturing Sector High Exit Rate Committee 
 
Bridge pension (1) Other Exit (2) Bridge pension (3) Other Exit (4) 
ATT in pp 3.5 - -0.9 -1.9 
95% CI [-0.2;  6.9] - [-5.1;  -2.3] [-5.4, 1.4] 
Pvalue 0.225 - 0.495 0.259 
ATT % 12.5% - -3.9% -11.3% 
N° of observations 51,539 - 147,600 147,600 
N° of individuals 11,077 - 33,538 33,538 
WDiD on parallel growths: impact on the share of people in pre-retirement/bridge pension (columns 1, 3) and in any other non-employment 
status (column 2,4) for the subpopulations for which a significant employment effect was estimated. Control group 53.25-55.25 years old; 
treated group 58-59.5 years old. Effects on specific subpopulation (defined in q-7) by column: (1 and 2) Workers in manufacturing sector, (3-4) 
Workers in sectoral industrial committees with high exit rate from employment. ATT are expressed in percentage points (pp) and percentage 
(%) changes. Estimates are not reported for the “other exit” outcome of women in the manufacturing sector since they are very noisy and not 
following a parallel path or growths. N° of observations is the sum of the number of individuals observed in each quarter of the analysis. 
Standard errors are obtained by a stratified bootstrap (clustering by individual) with 200 repetitions and 95% confidence intervals (CI) by 
assuming normality. ***: significant at 1%, **: significant at 5%, *: significant at 10%. 
 
In Table 4 we report further evidence that the positive employment effects are caused by a lower rate 
of entry into the bridge pension, at least for men. We observe that for men employed in the 
manufacturing sector or in a firm at high risk of early retirement the share in early retirement 
significantly decreases, while the share in other non-employment states is not significantly affected. 
For women, we do not find any effect that is significantly different from zero. This mirrors the 
imprecisely estimated effect on the employment rate. Hence, our data do not allow finding reliable 
estimates for women.39    
Finally, we do not find any significant effect on employment for any of the other subpopulations that 
we considered, even not for low-wage workers, suggesting that the pay-productivity gap is present for 
this group as well. These results are therefore largely in accordance with the hypotheses that we 
formulated, as well as with the existing scientific evidence. 
7.2. Effect on the Hours Worked 
Table 5 reports the impact on employment at the intensive margin. Since no subsidy is granted to 
employees working less than 33% of a full-time worker within a quarter, employers have incentives to 
increase the working time of the subgroup of individuals for whom the marginal productivity exceeds 
marginal costs. In line with this prediction the subsidy significantly reduces the number of men 
working less than 30% of a full-time by 13%, but since only few men are contained in this category, 
                                                          
39
 The estimates for the “other exit” outcome in the manufacturing sector are not reported since they are very noisy. Placebo 
tests reject the assumption of parallel path and at the same time the parallel growths assumption is unrealistic. 
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this decreases the share of men in this category by only 0.6 pp. In contrast, more women are working 
in this category. Consequently, even if the point estimate in pp is similar to that for men (-0.5 pp), the 
subsidy reduces the number of women in this category by only 4%, an effect that is not significantly 
different from zero. This contrasting evidence for men and women may be related to the lower supply 
elasticity of these specific women, who, more than men, may have deliberately chosen to work few 
hours as a consequence of the traditional gender division in caring responsibilities in the household. 
The subsidy essentially shifts men working less than 30% of a full-time to more than 80% (even if the 
latter effect is not significant). For women the subsidy significantly decreases the share of women in 
the category 30% to 80% of a full-time by 1.2 pp in favour of the category working more than 80%.            
In Section 4 we argued that the subsidy should especially affect the working time of individuals with an 
elastic labour supply, such as for workers who in the absence of the subsidy are encouraged by the 
time credit scheme to work part-time (50% or 80% of a full-time). The findings reported in Table 6 
confirm that the subsidy seems to have induced firms to discourage their employees to reduce their 
working time within the time credit scheme, especially for women, who are also more intensive users 
of this scheme (see Section 2).  
For men, the effect on the intensive margin is stronger for the sub-populations for which we estimated 
statistically significant effects on the employment rate. This suggests that for men the statistically 
significant impacts at the intensive margin may reflect compositional effects, i.e. that the employment 
gain at the extensive margin especially concerned full-time workers. The gain at the extensive margin 
is likely to have increased the share of employees working between 30% and 80% of a full-time. This 
can explain why the effect at the intensive margin is not significantly negative for this category, while 
Table 6 does report a significant decrease in the use of time credit for men. By contrast, for women, 
for whom we did not find employment effects at the extensive margin significantly different from 
zero, more positive effects on working time are observed, especially in the service sector and in large 
firms. This is consistent with access to time credit schemes being less restrictive in large firms (see 
Section 2 - in the pre-treatment period 21% of the women working in large firms was in time-credit, 
compared to 4% in small firms) and more used in the service sector (12% of the women working in the 
service sector was in time credit, compared to 7% in the manufacturing sector), increasing thereby the 
labour supply elasticity of these women. 
Based on the approximate fraction of working time (see footnote 20) we calculate the corresponding 
employment elasticities of the wage cost subsidy at the intensive margin. These elasticities are 
reported in the last two rows of Table 5. Overall, even if we do find significantly positive effects on the 
number of hours worked, the corresponding employment elasticities are small, irrespectively of the 
considered subpopulation. On average this elasticity is 0.13 for men and 0.28 for women.  
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Table 5:  Impact on the Hours Worked (Intensive Margin) 
Men Overall (1) Low Wage (2) Manufacturing Sector (3) Service Sector  (4) High Exit Rate (5) Low Exit Rate (6) Large Firms (7) Small Firms (8) Blue-collar (9) White-collar (10) 
0%-30%: ATT in pp -0.6*** -0.5** -0.4** -0.6*** -0.8*** -0.2 -0.4*** -0.6** -0.8** 0.1 
95% CI [-0.9; -0.2] [-1.0; -0.1] [-0.8; -0.1] [-1.0; -0.2] [-1.3; -0.3] [-0.6; 0.2] [-0.7; -0.2] [-1.1; -0.1] [-1.4; -0.2] [-0.2; 0.3] 
Pvalue 0.001 0.029 0.018 0.005 0.002 0.423 0.002 0.016 0.011 0.605 
ATT in % -13.4% -9.1% -14.7% -12.7% -15.3% -9.6% -21.7% -9.8% -11.5% 6.4% 
31%-80%: ATT in pp 0.0 -0.3 -0.7 0.1 -0.7 0.3 0.1 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 
95% CI [-0.7; 0.7] [-1.3; 0.7] [-1.7; 0.3] [-0.9; 1.1] [-1.6; 0.2] [-0.9; 1.5] [-0.8; 1.0] [-1.2; 0.7] [-1.3; 0.9] [-1.1; 0.6] 
Pvalue 1.000 0.576 0.183 0.790 0.118 0.625 0.803 0.569 0.658 0.584 
ATT in % 0.0% -1.4% -4.5% 0.8% -3.9% 2.1% 0.8% -1.4% -1.1% -2.0% 
>80%: ATT in pp 0.6 0.8* 1.1** 0.4 1.5*** -0.1 0.3 0.9* 1.0* 0.2 
95% CI [-0.1; 1.2] [-0.1; 1.8] [0.1; 2.2] [-0.5; 1.4] [0.6; 2.4] [-1.3; 1.1] [-0.7; 1.3] [-0.1; 1.9] [-0.1; 2.1] [-0.7; 1.1] 
Pvalue 0.103 0.088 0.036 0.366 0.001 0.839 0.518 0.073 0.064 0.697 
ATT in % 0.7% 1.1% 1.4% 0.6% 2.0% -0.1% 0.4% 1.2% 1.4% 21.2% 
ATT total hours % 0.5%** 0.5%* 0.7%*** 0.4% 1.1%*** 0.0% 0.2% 0.7%** 0.8%** 0.0% 
95% CI [0.0; 0.9] [0.0; 1.2] [0.1; 1.2] [-0.2; 1.0] [0.4; 1.7] [-0.6; 0.6] [-0.3; 0.8] [0.1; 1.3] [0.1; 1.5] [-0.4; 0.4] 
Elasticity 0.128 0.121 0.196 0.107 0.245 0.005 0.099 0.158 0.165 0.006 
N° of observations 433,373 266,378 227,946 200,287 255,441 150,242 231,979 201,387 216,985 186,156 
N° of individuals 98,899 61,784 51,504 47,250 59,422 36,361 53,673 48,140 49,869 43,032 
           
Women Overall (1) Low Wage (2) Manufacturing Sector (3) Service Sector  (4) High Exit Rate (5) Low Exit Rate (6) Large Firms (7) Small Firms (8) Blue-collar (9) White-collar (10) 
0%-30%: ATT in pp -0.5 -0.5 0.4 -0.7* -0.8 0.0 -0.8** -0.4 -0.2 -0.4 
95% CI [-1.2; 0.2] [-1.5; 0.6] [-1.2; 2.1] [-1.4; 0.0] [-1.8; 0.2] [-0.7; 0.6] [-1.7; 0.0] [-1.4; 0.5] [-1.7; 1.3] [-0.9; 0.2] 
Pvalue 0.131 0.369 0.612 0.066 0.111 0.910 0.046 0.396 0.765 0.217 
ATT in % -3.9% -2.5% 4.6% -5.0% -5.4% -0.5% -12.5% -2.2% -0.9% -7.3% 
31%-80%: ATT in pp -1.2** -1.9** -0.1 -1.2** -0.5 -1.9*** -1.9** -0.8 -1.0 -1.3** 
95% CI [-2.1; -0.2] [-3.4; -0.3] [-2.9; 2.7] [-2.4; -0.1] [-2.0; 1.0] [-3.2; -0.5] [-3.3; -0.4] [-2.1; 0.6] [-3.0; 1.0] [-2.6; -0.1] 
Pvalue 0.015 0.022 0.950 0.037 0.497 0.005 0.011 0.254 0.313 0.036 
ATT in % -2.6% -3.5% -0.2% -2.6% -1.0% -4.1% -3.6% -1.9% -2.0% -3.0% 
>80%: ATT in pp 1.7*** 2.3*** -0.3 1.9*** 1.3** 1.9*** 2.7*** 1.2** 1.2 1.7*** 
95% CI [0.8; 2.6] [1.0; 3.7] [-3.1; 2.4] [0.9; 2.9] [0.0; 2.7] [0.8; 3.0] [1.4; 4.1] [0.0; 2.4] [-0.3; 2.8] [0.5; 2.9] 
Pvalue 0.000 0.001 0.812 0.000 0.049 0.001 0.000 0.047 0.119 0.004 
ATT in % 4.3% 8.5% -0.6% 4.9% 3.7% 4.1% 6.6% 3.1% 5.3% 3.4% 
ATT total hours % 1.5%*** 2.3%*** 0.6% 1.7%*** 1.5%** 1.2%*** 2.1%*** 1.4%** 1.9%* 1.1%*** 
95% CI [0.7; 2.4] [1.1; 3.5] [-1.5; 2.7] [0.9; 2.5] [0.4; 2.7] [0.3; 2.1] [1.0; 3.1] [0.2; 2.5] [0.0; 3.8] [0.3; 1.8] 
Elasticity 0.280 0.302 0.124 0.302 0.262 0.240 0.416 0.219 0.243 0.223 
N° of observations 224,284 104,255 36,457 184,959 102,682 102,657 107,646 116,432 65,313 139,865 
N° of individuals 53,299 26,224 8,621 44,006 25,354 24,424 25,782 28,568 16,401 32,486 
WDiD on parallel path: impact on the intensive margin defined as number of workers with a certain working time with respect to the reference time (0-30%, 31-80%, >81%). Control group is 53.25-55.25 years old; treated group 58-
59.5 years old. Effects on specific subpopulation (defined in time q) by column: (1) Overall treated group, (2) Workers earning less than the treatment group median wage, (3) Workers in secondary sector, (4) Workers in tertiary 
sector, (5) Workers in sectoral industrial committees with an exit rate from employment above the median (= 18%), (6) Workers in sectoral industrial committees with an exit rate below the median, (7) Workers in firms with at 
least 200 employees, (8) Workers in firms with less than 200 employees, (9) Blue-collar workers, (10) White-collar workers. The elasticity approximates the working time elasticity of the wage cost subsidy (see footnote 20). 
Standard errors are obtained by a stratified bootstrap (clustering by individual) with 200 repetitions and 95% confidence intervals (CI) by assuming normality. ***: significant at 1%, **: significant at 5%, *: significant at 10%.  
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Table 6: Impact on the Time-Credit  
 
Overall sample (1) High Exit Rate (2) Low Exit Rate  (3) 
 
Men Women Men Women Men Women 
ATT pp -0.7*** -1.2*** -2.0*** -1.3*** 0.3 -0.9* 
CI [-1.2; -0.2] [-1.8; -0.5] [-2.7, -1.4] [-2.2, -0.3] [-0.4, 1.1] [-1.93, 0.6] 
Pvalue 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.369 0.065 
ATT % -9.8% -8.0% -32.8% -9.6% 4.0% -5.8% 
N Observations 433,373 224,284 59,406 25,347 36,346 24,400 
N clusters 98,899 53,299 255,398 102,659 150,205 102,577 
WDiD on parallel path: impact on the share of people in part-time time-credit for the overall employed sample. Control group is 53.25-55.25 
years old; treated group 58-59.5 years old. Effects on specific subpopulation (defined in time q) by column: (1) Overall treated group, (2) Workers in 
sectoral industrial committees with an exit rate from employment above the median (= 18%), (3) Workers in sectoral industrial committees with an exit 
rate below the median. N° of observations is the sum of the number of individuals observed in each quarter of the analysis. Standard errors are 
obtained by a stratified bootstrap (clustering by individual) with 200 repetitions and 95% confidence intervals (CI) by assuming normality. ***: 
significant at 1%, **: significant at 5%, *: significant at 10%. 
7.3. Effect on the Hourly Wage 
 In Section 4 we argued that in the short run we do not expect the reduction of employers’ SSC to have 
any impact on gross wages (net of employers’ SSC) and, consequently, neither on the net wage. In 
Table A.2 in the Appendix we report the ATT of the wage cost subsidy on gross wages. In line with this 
hypothesis, the gross wage elasticity of the wage cost subsidy is small and never statistically significant 
at the 5% level. The overall point estimates of the elasticity are -0.09 for men and 0.02 for women. 
This is not a consequence of a lack of precision. Even at the upper bound of the 95% confidence 
interval it is small, respectively 0.270 and 0.137. One could criticize these results on the grounds that 
they do not take the Heckman’s (1974) selection bias into account. If the wage cost subsidy saved 
selective jobs in terms of hourly wage, then this could bias our findings. However, we did not find that 
the impact of the subsidy on the employment rate was higher for low-wage workers.  
7.4. Substitution and Anticipatory effects 
In a sensitivity analysis we considered a wider control group, containing workers who are closer to the 
age eligibility threshold of 58 years. This control group contains workers from age 53.25 up to 57 
rather than up to 55.25 as in the baseline analysis. The impact of the wage cost subsidy is found to be 
robust on the hours worked and the hourly gross wage. However, the effects on employment are 
found to be stronger when we consider employment at the extensive margin as outcome (see 
summary tables in Appendix A2). This suggests that the reduction of wage costs for older workers 
induces employers to substitute older for younger workers. In Section 4.3 we indeed argued that the 
Canada Dry early retirement system makes it possible for firms to push younger instead of older 
workers into early retirement. This also implies that the baseline analysis might overestimate the net 
effect of the wage cost subsidy on the employment rate, since at least part of the positive effects 
would then come at the expense of employment of younger workers. 
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7.5. Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) 
To get an idea of the welfare benefits or costs involved, we report a CBA for two scenarios. We 
calculate the effect of the subsidy on three indicators, all measured per job saved by the policy:  
(i) Gross budgetary cost: average cost of the subsidy for the state before any behavioural impact; 
(ii) Net budgetary cost: average cost of the subsidy for the state, net of savings for the public budget, 
i.e. tax revenues (income tax and contributions to social security) generated by the jobs that were 
saved by the policy,40 as well as the outlays that the government would have spent in the absence 
of the policy, mostly on allowances to the early retirees (at the extensive margin) or to participants 
in the time-credit scheme (at the intensive margin); 
(iii) Welfare gain (or cost) for society: the gain in terms of the production generated by these saved 
jobs minus the efficiency cost (“excess burden” or “deadweight loss”) of the net budgetary 
expenditures mentioned in (ii). To calculate this efficiency cost we multiply the effect on 
government budget by the Marginal Cost of Public Funds (MCF) minus one.41 For Belgium a MCF 
equal to two is considered to be appropriate (Kleven and Kreiner 2006; Barrios Cobos et al. 2013). 
The value of production is adjusted for the pay-productivity gap. As Vandenberghe et al. (2013) 
estimate this gap for the age class 58-59.5 to be 15.7%, the labour costs are multiplied by 0.843.  
We follow Staubli and Zweimüller (2013) by estimating the two building blocks of these indicators (the 
net budgetary cost for the state and the saved production) in exactly the same way as we estimate the 
baseline ATT for the outcome variables of interest, i.e. by a trend-adjusted WDiD on the values of 
these indicators for each individual retained in the analysis.42 We do this analysis separately for the 
workers in sectoral industrial committees with a high and a low risk of exiting employment and 
subsequently aggregate up the results. In the CBA we ignore a number of components, because they 
are difficult to measure. We overestimate the benefit for society by (i) not counting the opportunity 
cost of working for the saved jobs, (ii) not taking into account that the estimated employment effects 
may be biased upwards through substitution of individuals in the control group by eligible older 
workers (Section 4.3 and 7.4), and (iii) not taking into account that in about 43% of the industrial 
committees firms using early-retirement schemes are obliged to replace early retirees by unemployed 
workers (Section 2 and 4.3). We also ignore the potential distributional and health impacts of the 
subsidy. It is a priori unclear in which direction the latter neglect biases our CBA.  
                                                          
40
 Since information on personal income taxes and personal SSC is missing in our data, we approximate this by multiplying 
the wage cost by 0.567, i.e. the average tax wedge in 2001 (OECD, 2007). 
41
 The net budgetary cost of the policy is not, in se, a cost to society, since it just involves transfers between individuals. 
42
 Staubli and Zweimüller (2013) only consider the effect on the budgetary cost, not on saved production, since they do not 
calculate the welfare gain (cost) for society. In these estimations we ignore allowances for those entering statutory early 
retirement, sickness and disability and the productivity of self-employed workers. However, since only 1.1% of the relevant 
sub-sample is entitled to these allowances and only 0.9% is self-employed, this only introduces a slight bias. 
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Table 7: Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
2002 subsidy (1) 
 
Overall Men Women 
Gross budgetary cost per saved job €5,993 €6,617 €4,673 
Net budgetary cost per saved job €2,788 €3,242 €1,829 
Net cost to society per saved job €326 €948 -€988 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Targeted subsidy (2) 
 
Overall Men Women 
Gross budgetary cost per saved job €2,805 €3,204 €1,961 
Net budgetary cost per job €341 €696 -€410 
Net cost to society per saved job -€2,083 -€1,485 -€3,348 
Monthly costs (benefits if negative) in 2004 euros per saved job. (1) Cost-benefit analysis for the SSC exemption on all the individuals (58-59.5 years old) 
from the second quarter of 2002 until the second quarter of 2003; (2) Cost-benefit analysis in the counterfactual of a policy targeting the subsidy to the 
high-exit flow sectoral industrial committees. Control units are 53.25-55.25 years old. Gross cost per saved job is the total cost of the wage cost subsidy 
divided by the number of saved jobs. Net cost per saved job is estimated by a trend adjusted WDiD on the individual net budgetary gross cost of the 
policy divided by the number of saved jobs. The net cost to society is the efficiency cost of public funds minus the value of production generated by the 
jobs that were saved by reduction in SSC. The latter is estimated by trend adjusted WDiD on the individual gross wage costs multiplied by 0.843 to 
account for the pay-productivity gap. The CBA ignores potential substitution and anticipation effects. The costs to society ignore the value of leisure, 
the potential distributional and health impacts of the measure, and the potential benefits in the absence of the subsidy that some of the early retirees 
would be replaced by unemployed workers.  
In Table 7 we report the outcome of our CBA. We perform the CBA for two cases. In the first case the 
subsidy is, as in reality, granted both to the high and the low-exit sectoral industrial committees. In the 
second hypothetical case the subsidy is targeted to the high-exit sectoral industrial committees. 
Overall the wage cost subsidy targeted to older workers is clearly an expensive policy that fails the 
cost-benefit test. The gross cost per saved job is nearly €6,000 and the net cost remains as high as 
€2,800. The net cost to society is €326. Since, as higher mentioned, a number of costs have been 
ignored in the calculations, this is likely a lower bound. For women we find a net benefit of €990 for 
society. This is because the point estimate of the ATT of the subsidy on the employment rate is higher 
for women than for men (Table 3). However, this finding should be interpreted cautiously, since this 
ATT was not statistically significantly different from zero.  
Our findings strongly suggest that effectiveness could be enhanced if the target group of the subsidy 
could be further narrowed down to workers at high risk of exit to early retirement. Indeed in case the 
subsidy would have been targeted to high-exit sectoral industrial committees, the gross and net cost 
of the subsidy would only have been about €2,800 and €340, while society would gain about €2,080 
per saved job. Even if this gain is overestimated, it is substantial and, hence, likely to remain positive if 
the ignored costs would be taken into account. However, such a targeting of the subsidy would breach 
the EU fair competition law. Furthermore, raising the early retirement age seems a much cheaper 
alternative policy measure to achieve the same effect (see e.g. Staubli and Zweimüller, 2013). 
However, this assumes that the employer will not dismiss workers if the option of early retirement is 
no longer available. Due to the important pay-productivity gap for older workers in Belgium, this is a 
strong assumption. In addition, delaying the age of early retirement increases the cost of using 
deferred compensation schemes as incentive device (Lazear, 1979). In sum, further research is 
required to determine the best strategy for retaining older workers in the labour force.  
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8. Conclusion 
This paper studies the effect of a wage subsidy targeted to older workers on employment, working 
time and hourly wage. In the last years several OECD countries have implemented such measures to 
postpone the retirement of older workers. However, evidence on the effectiveness of such policies is 
scarce. Our research provides new evidence by estimating the impact of an automatic €400 quarterly 
reduction of employers’ Social Security Contributions (SSC) introduced in Belgium in 2002.   
Based on a large sample of 243,655 older individuals for whom we could observe using administrative 
registers the labour market history from as early as 1957, we estimate the effect of this wage cost 
subsidy on the employment rate, working time and hourly wage. In order to enhance the precision of 
our estimates, the sample was endogenously stratified such that entries in and exits from private 
sector employment were over-represented. By comparing the evolution of outcome variables for 
eligible older workers to non-eligible younger workers we could identify the Average Treatment effect 
on the Treated (ATT) of this policy measure. More precisely, we implemented a Conditional Difference-
in-Differences (CDiD) estimator by Inverse Probability Weighting (IPW) which we adjusted to 
accommodate for the endogenous sampling. In addition, to allow for an age related shock at 58, 
induced by the legal possibility of entering early retirement, we used this weighted DiD estimator in a 
multiple repeated cross-sections framework, where we kept the age fixed over time rather than the 
individual, as in a panel framework. We conducted placebo tests on pre-treatment data and, in case of 
rejection, proposed a parametric trend-adjusted weighted DiD estimator.  
In line with the scarce literature, we find that the wage cost subsidy has only a small impact on 
employment, both at the intensive and extensive margin and that the hourly gross wage is not 
significantly affected. As predicted by our theoretical model, the subsidy seems to be more effective 
for workers at risk of leaving the labour market and enter early retirement. Nevertheless, this result 
requires some qualification, since we find evidence that it may partly reflect a substitution of older for 
younger workers.  Overall, the policy reform does not pass the cost-benefit test. If the subsidy could 
have been targeted at sectoral industrial committees in which the risk of early retirement is high, then 
this conclusion is reversed. However, it is not clear whether there is a legal basis for such refinement 
of the target population. In addition, increasing the age of early retirement seems to be a cheaper 
policy alternative that could achieve similar effects. However, this hinges on the assumption that 
employers would then not dismiss these workers. Whether this assumption is realistic may depend on 
the institutional context and is matter for future research.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A.1:  Descriptive Statistics for the Treatment and Control Groups in the Baseline Model 
  
Men Women 
  
Mean 
t-test 
Mean  
equality 
Mean 
t-test 
Mean  
equality 
 
Variable Treated Control p>|t| Treated Control p>|t| 
Province 
Brussels 7.67% 7.13% 0.099 8.42% 8.38% 0.936 
Antwerp 17.06% 16.10% 0.033 16.94% 16.65% 0.646 
Flemish Brabant 10.64% 10.50% 0.719 10.53% 10.56% 0.952 
West Flanders 12.94% 10.94% 0.000 12.17% 10.60% 0.003 
East Flanders 14.50% 13.43% 0.012 13.91% 13.58% 0.571 
Limburg 8.11% 8.04% 0.849 7.62% 7.20% 0.342 
Walloon Brabant  3.75% 3.69% 0.804 3.55% 3.90% 0.248 
Hainaut 11.26% 13.31% 0.000 11.04% 12.95% 0.000 
Liège 8.54% 10.27% 0.000 9.89% 10.12% 0.636 
Luxembourg 1.70% 2.20% 0.008 1.93% 1.83% 0.679 
Namur 3.84% 4.39% 0.035 4.03% 4.23% 0.540 
Nationality 
Belgian 92.61% 92.59% 0.948 94.14% 94.52% 0.330 
EU 6.03% 6.28% 0.405 4.54% 4.22% 0.342 
Others 1.36% 1.13% 0.111 1.32% 1.26% 0.783 
Household composition 
Single 12.55% 12.82% 0.526 13.08% 11.00% 0.000 
Single with children 1.67% 2.46% 0.000 5.39% 7.58% 0.000 
Couple 31.58% 45.77% 0.000 23.75% 36.58% 0.000 
Couple with children 48.66% 33.15% 0.000 48.78% 39.15% 0.000 
other 5.54% 5.81% 0.384 9.00% 5.70% 0.000 
Household size 
1 13.25% 13.32% 0.868 13.89% 10.70% 0.000 
2 45.08% 29.90% 0.000 50.55% 39.42% 0.000 
3 24.66% 27.71% 0.000 23.30% 28.75% 0.000 
4 11.03% 19.39% 0.000 8.59% 14.81% 0.000 
5+ 5.98% 9.69% 0.000 3.67% 6.32% 0.000 
Household members 
Below18 years old 9.01% 19.15% 0.000 4.55% 11.57% 0.000 
Above 65 years old 5.11% 5.97% 0.003 8.58% 6.02% 0.000 
Primary status 7 q earlier 
Private sector employee 25.42% 37.61% 0.000 10.25% 17.70% 0.000 
Inactive 38.60% 21.23% 0.000 65.93% 54.05% 0.000 
Unemployed 1.70% 2.06% 0.018 2.42% 3.33% 0.000 
Public sector employee 17.61% 22.55% 0.000 14.70% 18.74% 0.000 
Self-employed 16.67% 16.56% 0.846 6.70% 6.18% 0.223 
Civil Servant 15.50% 19.19% 0.000 11.77% 13.90% 0.000 
Unemployment  
Unemployment duration (months) 73.03 62.33 0.000 87.4 72.9 0.000 
Unemployment benefit level (€/month) €834 €705 0.000 €660 €597 0.000 
Actual working time 
1%-30% 3.26% 2.44% 0.000 11.40% 9.00% 0.000 
31%-80% 14.53% 12.27% 0.000 43.59% 43.01% 0.224 
81%-100% 82.21% 85.29% 0.000 45.02% 47.99% 0.000 
Sector (Nace Rev. 1.) 
Nace 1-19 4.27% 4.45% 0.178 - - - 
Nace 20-29 12.68% 15.75% 0.000 - - - 
Nace 30-39 3.96% 5.87% 0.000 - - - 
Nace 40-49 9.35% 9.12% 0.396 - - - 
Nace 50-59 11.01% 9.77% 0.000 11.33% 12.83% 0.000 
Nace 60 4.54% 6.08% 0.000 - - - 
Nace 61-64 4.79% 5.53% 0.070 - - - 
Nace 65-69 5.16% 5.48% 0.097 - - - 
Nace 70-74 5.24% 5.03% 0.231 5.86% 6.85% 0.000 
Nace 75-79 18.26% 17.85% 0.604 15.56% 17.56% 0.080 
Nace 80-84 15.19% 9.69% 0.000 34.74% 26.54% 0.000 
Nace 85-89 2.80% 3.26% 0.048 14.51% 15.37% 0.270 
Nace 90-99 2.75% 2.13% 0.006 4.11% 3.90% 0.520 
Nace 1-49 - - - 7.11% 9.66% 0.000 
Nace 60-69 - - - 6.78% 7.28% 0.290 
Career break Career break 2.77% 2.08% 0.000 9.16% 11.26% 0.000 
Working time 
Full-time 92.04% 93.82% 0.000 63.72% 54.15% 0.000 
Part-time 7.37% 5.60% 0.000 35.11% 44.32% 0.000 
Special time 0.59% 0.58% 0.810 1.17% 1.53% 0.030 
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Firm size 
<5 5.10% 4.31% 0.000 7.71% 7.71% 0.990 
5-9 4.05% 3.83% 0.100 4.09% 4.32% 0.410 
10-19 5.34% 5.00% 0.030 4.46% 4.43% 0.940 
20-49 9.38% 9.06% 0.180 5.68% 6.65% 0.010 
50-99 6.09% 6.17% 0.700 3.83% 4.80% 0.010 
100-199 6.65% 7.06% 0.160 4.28% 5.14% 0.030 
200-499 9.91% 9.98% 0.860 7.00% 8.38% 0.020 
500-999 6.76% 7.20% 0.220 6.18% 6.94% 0.180 
1000+ 46.74% 47.41% 0.370 56.80% 51.64% 0.000 
Experience (in quarters) 
28 - 5.5 years before 52.44 55.145 0.000 26.711 33.723 0.000 
2.75 - 1.75 years before 1.4027 2.0366 0.000 0.6293 1.0622 0.000 
Never employed 
28 - 5.5 years before 22.45% 17.06% 0.000 43.10% 29.19% 0.000 
2.75 - 1.75 years before 69.06% 56.47% 0.000 86.05% 76.57% 0.000 
Severance payment (times) 
28 - 5.5 years before 0.4797 0.4576 0.130 0.3578 0.3223 0.030 
2.75 - 1.75 years before 0.0058 0.0043 0.100 0.0059 0.0044 0.300 
Share of time blue-collar 
28 - 5.5 years before 55.80% 54.98% 0.190 49.58% 45.72% 0.000 
2.75 - 1.75 years before 45.67% 52.08% 0.000 39.50% 37.25% 0.020 
Working time 
10.75 - 5.5 years before 60.08% 59.87% 0.740 33.61% 36.25% 0.000 
2.75 - 1.75 years before 85.25% 87.17% 0.000 66.29% 68.50% 0.000 
Full-time quarterly earnings 2.75 - 1.75 years before €9,550 €8,929 0.000 €6,497 €6,552 0.380 
N observation - 298,337 460,240 - 150,897 293,941 - 
N individuals (clusters) - 65,908 86,107 - 33,432 55,403 - 
Descriptive statistics for the units in the baseline model (i.e. treated 58-59.5 years old; control 53.25-55.25 years old). The reported means are 
weighted by the sampling weights defined in Equation (2) in the main text. In this descriptive analysis values of variables are set to missing, 
and hence ignored in the calculation of the sample means, if the value is not known for this individual (e.g. the wage for people not employed 
or the unemployment benefit if not unemployed). In the CDiD analysis the values of these variables are set to zero instead. The p-values 
reported are for the t-tests of equality of means allowing for individual serial correlation (cluster robust SEs).  
 
Figure A.1:  Parallel path and Trend: outcome variables after IPW weights
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Table A.2:  Impact on the Hourly Gross Wage: control group 53.25-55.25 years old 
Men Overall (1) Low wage (2) Manufacturing Sector (3) Service sector  (4) High exit rate (5) Low exit rate (6) Large firms (7) Small firms (8) Blue-collar (9) White-collar (10) 
ATT in € -0.07 0.05 -0.02 0.19 0.03 0.24 0.05 0.09 0.03 0.06 
95% CI [-0.32; 0.19] [-0.01; 0.11] [-0.35; 0.30] [-0.11; 0.49] [-0.15; 0.21] [-0.12; 0.61] [-0.24; 0.33] [-0.17; 0.34] [-0.03; 0.10] [-0.27; 0.04] 
Pvalue 0.604 0.089 0.891 0.209 0.752 0.192 0.747 0.513 0.348 0.717 
ATT in % -0.3% 0.4% -0.1% 1.0% 0.2% 1.0% 0.2% 0.5% 0.2% 0.2% 
N° of observations 389,986 240,111 203,832 181,563 230,551 134,223 208,084 181,897 195,516 166,993 
N° of individuals 92,630 57,941 48,093 44,332 55,844 33,764 50,129 44,757 46,904 40,077 
Elasticity  -0.093  0.087 -0.031  0.249  0.040  0.342  0.066  0.119  0.045  0.088 
Elasticity Upper CI  0.270  0.166  0.412  0.666  0.273  0.863  0.470  0.421  0.148  0.571 
  
 
        
 
Women Overall (1) Low wage (2) Manufacturing Sector (3) Service sector(4) High exit rate (5) Low exit rate (6) Large firms (7) Small firms (8) Blue-collar (9) White-collar (10) 
ATT in € 0.01 0.01 0.24* -0.03 0.05 0.01 -0.04 0.09* 0.03 -0.03 
95% CI [-0.07; 0.10] [-0.05; 0.08] [-0.03; 0.51] [-0.12; 0.05] [-0.07; 0.16] [-0.12; 0.13] [-0.18; 0.10] [-0.01; 0.20] [-0.05; 0.11] [-0.14; 0.08] 
Pvalue 0.750 0.697 0.081 0.436 0.420 0.932 0.547 0.090 0.490 0.576 
ATT in % 0.1% 0.1% 1.7% -0.3% 0.4% 0.0% -0.3% 0.8% 0.3% -0.2% 
N° of observations 223,918 104,112 36,274 184,691 102,560 102,470 107,409 116,305 65,242 139,641 
N° of individuals 53,222 26,186 8,587 43,939 25,325 24,399 25,733 28,534 16,383 32,455 
Elasticity  0.018  0.018  0.356 -0.046  0.063  0.007 -0.055  0.124  0.040 -0.042 
Elasticity Upper CI  0.137  0.140  0.755  0.135  0.271  0.137  0.131  0.274  0.142  0.139 
WDiD on parallel path: impact on the hourly gross wage. Control group is 53.25-55.25 years old; treated group 58-59.5 years old. Effects on specific subpopulation (defined in time q) by column: (1) Overall treated 
group, (2) Workers earning less than the treatment group median wage, (3) Workers in secondary sector, (4) Workers in tertiary sector, (5) Workers in sectoral industrial committees with an exit rate from 
employment above the median (= 18%), (6) Workers in sectoral industrial committees with an exit rate below the median, (7) Workers in firms with at least 200 employees, (8) Workers in firms with less than 200 
employees, (9) Blue-collar workers, (10) White-collar workers. N° of observations is the sum of the number of individuals observed in each quarter of the analysis. Standard errors are obtained by a stratified bootstrap 
(clustering by individual) with 200 repetitions and 95% confidence intervals (CI) by assuming normality. ***: significant at 1%, **: significant at 5%, *: significant at 10%. 
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Table A.3: Impact on the Employment Rate (Extensive Margin): control group 53.25-57 years old 
Men 
Overall 
(1) 
Already  
Working (2)  
Low wage 
(3) 
Manufacturing  
Sector (4) 
Service 
 sector  (5) 
High exit rate  
Committee (6) 
Low exit rate  
Committee  (7) 
Large firms 
(8) 
Small firms 
(9) 
Blue-collar 
(10) 
White-collar 
(11) 
ATT in pp 0.7*** 2.2*** 1.2 3.5*** 0.5 3.2*** 0.1 4.0*** -0.5 0.6 1.9* 
95% CI [0.2; 1.2] [0.8; 3.6] [-0.9, 3.3] [1.4, 5.7] [-1.5; 2.5] [1.3, 5.0] [-2.4, 2.5] [1.7; 6.4] [-2.4; 1.5] [-1.5; 2.8] [-0.2; 4.1] 
Pvalue 0.004 0.002 0.278 0.001 0.617 0.001 0.967 0.001 0.642 0.565 0.073 
ATT % 4.0% 3.5% 2.1% 6.8% 0.7% 5.9% 0.1% 6.8% -0.7% 1.2% 2.7% 
N° of observations 1,135,596 811,981    475,377    459,360    343,377    526,758    285,060    446,649 363,630 453,725 358,090 
N° of individuals 152,280 123,519    77,403 69,197 55,170 82,887    46,873    68,858 59,850    70,570 53,934 
Subsidy/Labor cost 3.7% 3.6% 5.0% 3.4% 3.8% 4.3% 3.0% 2.9% 4.4% 4.4% 4.4% 
Elasticity 1.084 0.965 0.41 2.006 0.179 1.364 0.023 2.336 -0.155 0.233 0.73 
Semi-Elasticity in pp 0.187 0.611 0.231 1.051 0.133 0.736 0.017 1.387 -0.106 0.146 0.448 
              
Women 
Overall 
(1) 
Already  
Working (2)  
Low wage 
(3) 
Manufacturing  
Sector (4) 
Service 
 sector  (5) 
High exit rate  
Committee (6) 
Low exit rate  
Committee  (7) 
Large firms 
(8) 
Small firms 
(9) 
Blue-collar 
(10) 
White-collar 
(11) 
ATT in pp 0.5*** 1.7 1.9 2.7 1.3 4.9*** -0.4 1.9 1.3 2.2 1.6 
95% CI [0.1.; 0.9] [-0.6; 3.9] [-1.3, 5.1] [-3.3, 8.7] [-1.1, 3.8]   [1.5; 8.2] [-3.7, 2.9] [-1.3; 5.1] [-1.1, 3.8]        [-1.9; 6.4] [-1.1; 4.4] 
Pvalue 0.002 0.151 0.254 0.377 0.288 0.004 0.813 0.253 0.422 0.290 0.247 
ATT % 6.7% 2.5% 2.8% 5.0% 1.8% 8.5% -0.5% 3.0% 1.7% 3.7% 2.3% 
N° of observations 660,465  422,126 208,550 76,784 339,573 218,856    203,239 208,655 213,404 143,008 278,991 
N° of individuals 89,062 65,118 36,509 11,724 52,760 35,853 32,108 32,184 35,525 24,229 41,488 
Subsidy/Labor cost 5.5% 5.4% 7.6% 4.5% 5.5% 5.7% 5.2% 4.9% 6.0% 6.0% 6.0% 
Elasticity 1.220 0.459 0.376 1.137 0.341 1.478 -0.100 0.614 0.291 0.530 0.381 
Semi-Elasticity in pp 0.090 0.311 0.247 0.606 0.242 0.849 -0.077 0.378 0.214 0.369 0.268 
WDiD on parallel growths: impact on the employment rate. Control group is 53.25-57 years old; treated group 58-59.5 years old. Effects on specific subpopulation (defined in q-7) by column: (1) Overall treated group, 
(2) Workers earning less than the treatment group median wage, (3) Workers in secondary sector, (4) Workers in tertiary sector, (5) Workers in sectoral industrial committees with an exit rate from employment 
above the median (= 18%), (6) Workers in sectoral industrial committees with an exit rate below the median, (7) Workers in firms with at least 200 employees , (8) Workers in firms with less than 200 employees, (9) 
Blue-collar workers, (10) White-collar workers. Point estimates of the ATT are expressed in percentage points (pp), in proportional (%) changes in the employment rate and in terms of (semi-)elasticity, i.e. the 
proportional (pp) effect on the employment rate of a proportional reduction in the labour costs. N° of observations is the sum of the number of individuals observed in each quarter of the analysis. Standard errors are 
obtained by a stratified bootstrap (clustering by individual) with 200 repetitions and 95% confidence intervals (CI) by assuming normality. ***: significant at 1%, **: significant at 5%, *: significant at 10%. 
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Table A.4:  Impact on the intensive margin: control group 53.25-57 years old 
 
 
Overall (1) Low Wage (2) Manufacturing Sector (3) Service Sector  (4) High Exit Rate (5) Low Exit Rate (6) Large Firms (7) Small Firms (8) Blue-collar (9) White-collar (10) 
Men 
0%-30%: ATT in pp -0.5*** -0.5** -0.3* -0.5*** -0.6*** -0.1 -0.2* -0.5** -0.5** -0.0 
95% CI [-0.8; -0.2] [-0.9; -0.1] [-0.7; 0.01] [-0.9; -0.2] [-1; -0.2] [-0.4; 0.2] [-0.5; 0.02] [-0.9; -0.1] [-1.1; -0.01] [-0.2; 0.2] 
Pvalue 0.001 0.012 0.054 0.006 0.002 0.499 0.074 0.026 0.046 0.742 
ATT in % -11.6% -8.8% -12.2% -12.0% -12.9% -5.5% -13.0% -8.0% -8.4% -3.1% 
31%-80%: ATT in pp -0.1 -0.2 -0.5 0.0 -0.4 -0.3 0.1 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 
95% CI [-0.6; 0.5] [-1.1; 0.7] [-1.3; 0.4] [-0.9; 0.8] [-1.3; 0.4] [-1.1; 0.6] [-0.8; 0.9] [-1.1; 0.5] [-1.4; 0.6] [-1; 0.4] 
Pvalue 0.816 0.673 0.262 0.972 0.295 0.543 0.892 0.590 0.426 0.392 
ATT in % -0.4% -0.9% -3.1% -0.1% -2.4% -1.8% 0.4% -1.6% -1.8% -2.3% 
>80%: ATT in pp 0.5* 0.7 0.8* 0.6 1.1** 0.3 0.2 0.8** 0.9* 0.3 
95% CI [-1.1; 0.3] [-0.2; 1.6] [-0.1; 1.7] [-0.2; 1.4] [0.2; 1.9] [-0.5; 1.2] [-0.7; 1.1] [0.02; 1.6] [-0.1; 1.9] [-0.4; 1] 
Pvalue 0.080 0.129 0.067 0.163 0.014 0.427 0.704 0.044 0.065 0.354 
ATT in % 0.7% 1.0% 1.0% -0.7% 1.4% 0.4% 0.2% 1.1% 1.3% 0.4% 
ATT total hours % 0.4%** 0.4%* 0.5%* 0.4% 0.8%*** 0.2% 0.1% 0.6%** 0.6%* 0.1% 
95% CI [0.0; 0.7] [0.0; 0.7] [0.0; 0.9] [-0.1; 0.8] [0.2; 1.1] [-0.3; 0.6] [-0.4; 0.5] [0.1; 0.9] [0; 1.1] [-0.3; 0.5] 
Elasticity 0.108 0.093 0.146 0.108 0.174 0.064 0.040 0.128 0.125 0.048 
N° of observations 648,229 396,060 342,423 298,233 382,139 225,610 342,967 305,255 321,214 282,392 
N° of individuals 107,974 68,563 57,244 51,325 66,399 39,911 59,195 53,667 55,550 46,384 
Women 
0%-30%: ATT in pp -0.5* -0.5 1.0 -0.7** -0.8* 0.1 -0.6* -0.5 -0.3 -0.2 
95% CI [-1.1; 0.1] [-1.4; 0.5] [-0.5; 2.4] [-1.2; -0.1] [-1.7; 0.1] [-0.5; 0.6] [-1.3; 0.1] [-1.3; 0.3] [-1.5; 0.9] [-0.7; 0.3] 
Pvalue 0.077 0.352 0.196 0.029 0.092 0.846 0.098 0.236 0.597 0.334 
ATT in % -3.9% -2.4% 11.1% -5.0% -5.1% 0.7% -9.3% -2.7% -1.3% -5.1% 
31%-80%: ATT in pp -1.1** -1.6** -0.3 -1.2** -0.6 -1.8*** -2.1*** -0.6 -0.8 -1.4*** 
95% CI [-2.0; -0.2] [-2.9; -0.2] [-2.9; 2.1] [-2.2; -0.2] [-2; 0.8] [-2.9; -0.6] [-3.5; -0.7] [-1.8; 0.7] [-2.5; 0.9] [-2.4; -0.3] 
Pvalue 0.015 0.024 0.822 0.019 0.412 0.003 0.004 0.365 0.344 0.008 
ATT in % -2.4% -2.9% -0.9% -2.5% -1.2% -3.9% -4.0% -1.4% -1.6% -3.0% 
>80%: ATT in pp 1.6*** 2.0*** -0.6 1.9*** 1.4** 1.7*** 2.7*** 1.1* 1.2 1.6*** 
95% CI [0.7, 2.3] [1.0; 3.1] [-3.1; 1.9] [1; 2.8] [0.2; 2.5] [0.6; 2.8] [1.5; 4] [-0.03; 2.2] [-0.2; 2.5] [0.7; 2.5] 
Pvalue 0.000 0.000 0.618 0.000 0.022 0.004 0.000 0.057 0.101 0.001 
ATT in % 4.1% 7.3% -1.2% 4.8% 3.8% 3.7% 6.668% 2.7% 4.9% 3.2% 
ATT total hours % 1.4%*** 2.1%*** 0.0% 1.6%*** 1.5%*** 1.1%** 2.0%*** 1.3%** 1.9%** 0.9%*** 
95% CI [0.8; 1.4] [1.0; 1.9] [-1.8; 1.4] [0.8; 1.6] [0.5; 1.6] [0.3; 1.4] [1.1; 2] [0.2; 1.4] [0.3; 1.9] [0.3; 1.2] 
Elasticity 0.264 0.278 0.007 0.293 0.259 0.213 0.401 0.201 0.250 0.193 
N° of observations 334,197 154,033 54,378 275,663 153,797 152,568 162,395 171,502 96,797 209,222 
N° of individuals 58,205 29,278 9,573 48,010 28,183 26,566 28,363 31,601 18,326 34,955 
WDiD on parallel path: impact on the intensive margin defined as number of workers with a certain working time with respect to the reference time (0-30%, 31-80%, >81%). Control group is 53.25-57 years old; treated group 58-
59.5 years old. Effects on specific subpopulation (defined in time q) by column: (1) Overall treated group, (2) Workers earning less than the treatment group median wage, (3) Workers in secondary sector, (4) Workers in tertiary 
sector, (5) Workers in sectoral industrial committees with an exit rate from employment above the median (= 18%), (6) Workers in sectoral industrial committees with an exit rate below the median, (7) Workers in firms with at  
least 200 employees, (8) Workers in firms with less than 200 employees, (9) Blue-collar workers, (10) White-collar workers. The elasticity approximates the working time elasticity of the wage cost subsidy (see footnote 20). 
Standard errors are obtained by a stratified bootstrap (clustering by individual) with 200 repetitions and 95% confidence intervals (CI) by assuming normality. ***: significant at 1%, **: significant at 5%, *: significant at 10%. 
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Table A.5: Impact on the Hourly Gross Wage: control group 53.25-57 years old 
Men Overall (1) Low wage (2) Manufacturing Sector (3) Service sector  (4) High exit rate (5) Low exit rate (6) Large firms (7) Small firms (8) Blue-collar (9) White-collar (10) 
ATT in € 0.06 0.01 -0.33 0.21* 0.01 0.34*** 0.08 0.14 0.01 0.20* 
95% CI [-0.08; 0.19] [-0.05; 0.07] [-0.73; 0.07] [-0.01; 0.44] [-0.13; 0.15] [0.11; 0.57] [-0.15; 0.31] [-0.03; 0.32] [-0.05; 0.06] [-0.01; 0.41] 
Pvalue  0.421 0.735 0.107 0.058 0.931 0.004 0.503 0.105 0.843 0.060 
ATT in % 0.3% 0.1% -1.5% 1.1% 0.0% 1.4% 0.3% 0.9% 0.0% 0.0% 
N° of observations 581,180 356,134 305,982 268,396 344,243 200,070 306,613 274,566 288,870 251,735 
N° of individuals 103,296 65,585 54,682 48,973 63,708 37,718 56,338 50,790 53,332 44,099 
Elasticity 0.075 0.017 -0.441 0.281 0.008 0.440 0.110 0.201 0.009 0.287 
Elasticity Upper CI 0.270 0.166 0.095 0.530 0.135 0.783 0.441 0.421 0.088 0.571 
           
 
Women Overall (1) Low wage (2) Manufacturing Sector (3) Service sector  (4) High exit rate (5) Low exit rate (6) Large firms (7) Small firms (8) Blue-collar (9) White-collar (10) 
ATT in € -0.01 0.00 0.21* -0.05 0.03 -0.02 -0.04 0.06 0.02 -0.04 
95% CI [-0.08; 0.07] [-0.06; 0.07] [-0.03; 0.46] [-0.14; 0.04] [-0.07; 0.13] [-0.12; 0.08] [-0.16; 0.08] [-0.04; 0.16] [-0.06; 0.09] [-0.14; 0.06] 
Pvalue  0.884 0.934 0.086 0.257 0.570 0.703 0.499 0.262 0.631 0.448 
ATT in % 0.0% 0.0% 1.5% -0.4% 0.2% -0.1% -0.3% 0.5% 0.2% 0.4% 
N° of observations 333,652 153,826 54,126 275,255 153,603 152,304 162,029 171,323 96,684 208,898 
N° of individuals 58,138 29,249 9,536 47,950 28,166 26,548 28,319 31,570 18,312 34,934 
Elasticity -0.008 0.004 0.318 -0.070 0.040 -0.027 -0.053 0.079 0.026 -0.053 
Elasticity Upper CI 0.137 0.140 0.755 0.054 0.136 0.134 0.131 0.274 0.142 0.139 
WDiD on parallel path: impact on the hourly gross wage. Control group is 53.25-57 years old; treated group 58-59.5 years old. Effects on specific subpopulation (defined in time q) by column: (1) Overall treated group, 
(2) Workers earning less than the treatment group median wage, (3) Workers in secondary sector, (4) Workers in tertiary sector, (5) Workers in sectoral industrial committees with an exit rate from employment 
above the median (= 18%), (6) Workers in sectoral industrial committees with an exit rate below the median, (7) Workers in firms with at least 200 employees, (8) Workers in firms with less than 200 employees, (9) 
Blue-collar workers, (10) White-collar workers. N° of observations is the sum of the number of individuals observed in each quarter of the analysis. Standard errors are obtained by a stratified bootstrap (clustering by 
individual) with 200 repetitions and 95% confidence intervals (CI) by assuming normality. ***: significant at 1%, **: significant at 5%, *: significant at 10%. 
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